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Individuals and organizations rely on the Internet as an essential environment for
personal or business transactions. However, individuals and organizations have been pri-
mary targets for attacks that steal sensitive data. Adversaries can use different approaches
to hide their activities inside the compromised network and communicate covertly between
the malicious servers and the victims. The domain name system (DNS) protocol is one of
these approaches that adversaries use to transfer stolen data outside the organization’s net-
work using various forms of DNS tunneling attacks. The main reason for targeting the DNS
protocol is because DNS is available in almost every network, ignored, and rarely monitored.
In this work, the primary aim is to design a reliable and robust network-based solution as
a detection system against DNS-based attacks using various techniques, including visual-
ization, machine learning techniques, and statistical analysis. The network-based solution
acts as a DNS proxy server that provides DNS services as well as detection and prevention
against DNS-based attacks, which are either embedded in malware or used as stand-alone
attacking tools. The detection system works in two modes: real-time and offline modes.
The real-time mode relies on the developed Payload Analysis (PA) module. In contrast, the
offline mode operates based on two of the contributed modules in this dissertation, including
the visualization and Traffic Analysis (TA) modules. We conducted various experiments in
order to test and evaluate the detection system against simulated real-world attacks. Over-
all, the detection system achieved high accuracy of 99.8% with no false-negative rate. To
validate the method, we compared the developed detection system against the open-source
detection system, Snort intrusion detection system (IDS). We evaluated the two detection
systems using a confusion matrix, including the recall, false-negatives rate, accuracy, and
others. The detection system detects all case scenarios of the attacks while Snort missed
50% of the performed attacks. Based on the results, we can conclude that the detection
system is significant and original improvement of the present methods used for detecting
and preventing DNS-based attacks.
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1 Introduction
The Internet has become a significant part of people’s daily life and an essential
method for communications today. Individuals and companies rely on the Internet and use
it as a primary tool for doing their personal or private business. Thus, personal computers
and computer networks have been a primary target of data theft, malware software, and
other types of attacks such as accessing, changing, or destroying sensitive information that
interrupt normal business processes. This requires cybersecurity practices to protect systems,
networks, and applications from various cyber attacks. Cybersecurity provides multiple
layers of protection deployed among different components of network infrastructures to block
the Internet-based attacks and includes firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDSs).
However, sometimes adversaries can bypass these defensive mechanisms by using different
techniques. For example, the Domain Name System (DNS) is the critical backbone of the
Internet providing the mapping of human-readable names to Internet Protocol (IP) addresses
used for communication. Therefore, restricting the DNS protocol in a firewall or security
appliances is challenging, and it may raise usability issues since almost every communication
session on the Internet relies on the DNS protocol. Thus, the DNS protocol is one of
the most laborious protocols that must be maintained for reliable communication inside a
network environment.
1.1 Background
In this section, background information for this work is presented. The background
includes a description of the DNS protocol, its usage, and DNS attacks. In addition, data
exfiltration techniques and DNS tunneling attacks are introduced.
1.1.1 DNS Protocol
Network infrastructures are often the primary target of adversaries. If any of these
services go down or are not working probably, such as DNS, it can cause severe damage
to an organization’s business. DNS plays an essential role in the Internet architecture and
most of the Internet and internal network communications rely on the DNS protocol. It
is defined as a client-server protocol for exchanging names and IP addresses. The DNS
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protocol is a distributed hierarchical database which stores information about a group of
registered computers on the Internet. There are different types of information that the DNS
protocol can store such as IP addresses including IP version 4 (IPv4) and IP version 6 (IPv6),
hostnames, and mail routing information.
1.1.2 DNS Namespace Hierarchy
The DNS has a hierarchical tree structure called the DNS namespace. Each dot in
a domain name indicates the separation between levels in the tree structure. The top layer
of the DNS tree structure represents the root level which starts with a dot. Under the root
level, there are top-level domains (TLD) which are children domains of the root such as .com,
.net, .edu and others. Next, TLD also has children domains that reference the second level
of domains or authoritative domain name servers. Finally, the fully qualified domain name
(FQDN) locates the hostnames or subdomains within the DNS hierarchy [1]. For example,
the process of looking up the following domain name csce.uark.edu. is always started with
the dot which is the root server in the DNS tree structure. Then, the root server(s) forwards
the query to the correspondence TLD which in this case is .edu. Next, the TLD sends the
query to the secondary level domains. As soon the query is received by the authoritative
domain name server, it looks up the subdomain equivalent and returns its IP address. Figure
1.1 illustrates the DNS hierarchy.
Figure 1.1: The Domain Name System Hierarchy
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DNS translates and locates easy-to-remember domain names into corresponding IP
addresses and vice-versa. As seen in Figure 1.2, it is assumed that a user types a domain name
example.org in a browser on a computer. First, the browser attempts to resolve the IP address
of the domain name by checking the local cache of the computer. If there is no information
related to that domain name and depending on the network configuration, it often forwards
a query as a question seeking to match the domain name with its corresponding IP address
to the local DNS server or the Internet Service Provider’s (ISP) DNS server. Next, if the
information is still not found, the request is forwarded to root nameservers. The root servers
are located all over the world that point to the appropriate downstream name servers. Then,
it gets forwarded to the relevant TLD server which stores the address information for second
level domains example.org within the top-level domain .org. As soon as the information is
gathered from authoritative DNS servers, it resolves the domain name and responds to the
initial sender. Finally, the computer communicates with a web server to display the content
of the website.
Figure 1.2: How DNS works
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1.1.3 Data Exchange over DNS
The DNS is a stateless protocol, meant to receive and answer requests from clients.
The DNS protocol was not designed for data transfer. It was designed to exchange very
short and specific types of information [2]. According to [3], the length of any label of the
domain name is limited to between 1 and 63 bytes, and a full domain name is limited to 255
bytes if letters, digits, hyphens, and separators are included. However, the DNS protocol
is considered an excellent covert channel from a security perspective. A covert channel is
a channel used to transfer information between processes in a secretive manner, bypassing
the security policy of a system. Thus, adversaries may abuse and leverage the DNS protocol
to transfer data to their authoritative name server. Instead of sending legitimate subdo-
mains, adversaries take advantage of the limitation of the domain length and encode some
data in the domain name. For example, if the passw0rd.example.org domain is queried, the
authoritative name servers of example.org receives the passw0rd as a string and interpret
it as incoming data instead. Also, adversaries may use some other encoding techniques in
order to transfer text or binary data to their servers. For example, they can use Base32,
Base64, and Based128 to encode their data. In this case, the query will be as the follow-
ing:YWRtaW5AOnBhc3N3MHJkCg.example.org where YWRtaW5AOnBhc3N3MHJkCg is
a base64 form of the sensitive text file and this is called a DNS data exfiltration technique.
Note that if the required data exceeds the 255 bytes, then it has to be split into more than
one DNS query in order to be transferred via the DNS protocol. Data exchange over the
DNS protocol is shown in Figure 1.3
Although DNS is not intended to exchange data over its protocol, there is a limited
number of legitimate data exchange uses over the DNS protocol. Antivirus software compa-
nies were leveraging this technique to operate their services to clients. In 2007, Trend-Micro
Inc. leveraged the DNS protocol to distribute malicious code signatures for updating anti-
virus client software as an alternative communication channel. The signatures are exchanged
using DNS protocol TXT resource records and encoding the data with Base64 [4]. Similarly,
McAfee global threat intelligence (GTI) serves its file reputation service through the DNS
protocol. It enables clients to post a suspicious file through DNS queries to be scanned. GTI
File Reputation technology expands McAfee product security capacities by offering access
to an Internet cloud database that contains information on file classification to determine
if a file is malicious [5]. In 2009, Devicescape Software Inc. introduced an impressive pub-
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Figure 1.3: Data exchange over the DNS protocol
lic hotspot authentication system for mobile devices that leveraged the DNS protocol for
their communications where mobile devices exchange information and media access control
(MAC) addresses through the DNS protocol to communicate with a credential server [4]. In
addition, the malicious use of data exfiltration over the DNS occurs from other software and
malware, which are discussed later in this chapter.
1.1.4 DNS Attacks
The DNS protocol is vulnerable to several attacks such as cache poisoning and DNS
hijacking attacks that lead to compromising a user’s online account [6]. The DNS amplifi-
cation attack is a type of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack based on the DNS
protocol that may prevent visitors from reaching the organizations services [7]. There are
also other DNS attacks including DNS tunneling, name collisions, leaked queries, and DNS
response modification [8]. Most organizations pay more attention to filtering and securing
common protocols such as HTTP or FTP from malicious activities instead of the DNS pro-
tocol. Since the DNS protocol is not designed for data transfer, monitoring DNS has not
received much attention. Over the years, adversaries found different ways to leverage DNS
systems for malicious purposes. For example, suppose an organization blocks all outbound
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traffic except the DNS protocol and DNS activities are not monitored. Adversaries can still
transfer stolen or sensitive information through a firewall using DNS. They take advantage
of this open avenue and manipulate the use of the DNS service to establish undetected covert
channels.
1.1.5 DNS Tunneling Attack
The DNS tunneling attack is a method that encodes and encapsulates the data of
other applications or protocols in DNS queries and responses and is shown in Figure 1.4.
The original concept of DNS tunneling attack was designed to bypass the captive portals for
paid Wi-Fi service, especially at hotels and cafes. However, a data payload can be added
to attack internal networks that are used to control remote servers and applications, or to
perform DNS data exfiltration which is a technique being used to transfer unauthorized data
between two computers through the DNS protocol [9]. To successfully execute this attack,
an adversary requires a compromised machine within the internal organization network that
has access to the internal DNS server which has external access via the DNS protocol. In
this way, the adversary can use the compromised machine to establish a connection to an
outside computer using the DNS protocol. Adversaries must also register a domain name
and set up a remote server that can run as a DNS authoritative server.
Figure 1.4: The DNS tunneling attack
1.1.6 Communication Patterns
DNS tunneling and data exfiltration communication patterns are significantly dif-
ferent from the normal DNS patterns and from each other. The communication channel
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of DNS tunneling attack, which can be performed using software such as Iodine, DNScat,
DNS2TCP, and others, is more reliable than the DNS data exfiltration techniques. The
DNS tunneling attack communication has many keep-alive messages with bi-directional and
interactive patterns. Due to the DNS limitation of 255-byte messages, a high volume of DNS
queries is required. Therefore, a system administrator could quickly notice the attack if the
DNS protocol is monitored. The common usage of DNS tunneling attack is web browsing
over the DNS and remote desktop protocols. On the other hand, DNS data exfiltration is
less aggressive than DNS tunneling. The communication channel of DNS data exfiltration
is built on uni-directional patterns which does not require DNS replies from an authorita-
tive DNS server. DNS data exfiltration is usually performed by malware and command and
control (C&C) channels to transfer sensitive data, such as stolen credit cards, outside the
network through the firewall. In this technique, adversaries use common DNS records such
as A and AAAA, which makes the detection more difficult than the others.
1.1.7 Visualization
Visualization is not a new concept for monitoring network traffic. There are several
papers that used the parallel coordinates technique to monitor and visualize network traffic
[10, 11]. There are various benefits of using a parallel coordinates technique. First, it
is scalable. It helps to represent a considerable amount of data in an efficient manner
which makes analyzing big data more simple and powerful. Second, there is no limit on
the number of values for representing an attack using the parallel coordinates technique
that converts multidimensional data into two dimensions. Therefore, using the parallel
coordinates technique gives the ability to represent more than three different values within
a two-dimensional space. In this way, the relationship between the results can be reviewed
quickly showing prominent trends, correlations, and divergence from the raw data. Finally,
the visualized data using the parallel coordinates technique does not include any bias for
any column within the space [12, 13]. In other words, every visualized feature has the same
weight.
1.1.8 Machine Learning Techniques
Machine Learning is a part of Artificial Intelligence (AI) applications, and it is a
data analytics technique that provides the capability of systems for automatically learning
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and improving from experience without human interaction. Machine learning algorithms
use computational approaches to learn information directly from data without relying on a
predetermined equation as a model.
Machine learning consists of three primary classifications: supervised learning, unsu-
pervised learning, and semi-supervised learning. Supervised learning includes labeling infor-
mation on training data using classification algorithms to predict new data labels. On the
other hand, unsupervised machine learning uses unlabeled information and builds a classifier
based on learning and information characteristics analysis. It tends to automatically cluster
data. Finally, semi-supervised learning is a classifier using both labeled and unlabeled data
to train the algorithm [14]. Nowadays, machine learning is actively being used for various
topics, including detection systems against malicious activity. In Chapter 2, we list several
proposed systems that use machine learning for detecting abnormal activities including DNS
tunneling, data exfiltration, and botnets that use DNS protocol for communications.
1.2 Statement of Problem
Detecting and preventing DNS-based attacks is a challenging task. Adversaries use
DNS-based attacks to transfer sensitive data, such as stolen private organization data, or
establish covert communication channels to hide their malicious activities. DNS-based at-
tacks happen often and can result in a loss of revenue. The 2020 Global DNS Threat
Report revealed that 79% of organizations had experienced DNS-based attacks, including
DNS phishing, DNS-based malware, and DNS tunneling attacks [15]. Moreover, DNS-based
attacks were the main cause for 82% of application downtime in 2020, which caused ap-
proximately more than 1 million dollars of damage to these organizations. This work could
mitigate these attacks.
Adversaries can take advantage of DNS protocol and establish a covert channel since it
is allowed in almost every network, ignored, or rarely monitored. Many research groups have
proposed solutions for monitoring and detecting against DNS attacks without focusing on
the DNS tunneling attack. The data exfiltration over the DNS protocol and DNS tunneling
attack have not received much attention since it was proposed in 2008. As mentioned in
Farnham and Atlasis (2013), using the DNS tunneling attack, people are able to bypass
most of the firewall rules, restrictions and captive portals for paid Wi-Fi service and also can
transfer stolen or sensitive data to outside of the organization’s network [9]. Nowadays, most
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of the modern firewalls and IDS appliances do not block a DNS tunneling attack or raise the
alarm by default. For that reason, the DNS tunneling attack is attractive to adversaries or
people who design malicious applications.
The data exfiltration over the DNS protocol and DNS tunneling attacks are being
used in many real-world scenarios such as malware, botnets, trojans, and others. According
to [2], there are various types of well-known malware software that targets victims using the
DNS protocol for creating covert communication channels. Table 1.1 shows more information












Table 1.1: Well-known malware that uses DNS protocol for their communications
1.3 Goals of this work
The objectives of this work are listed below:
1. The DNS protocol is vulnerable to various categories of attacks, including DNS protocol
attacks, DNS server attacks, and DNS abuse. In this work, the main goal is to detect
and prevent DNS-based attacks based on the DNS abuse category. DNS-based attacks
include DNS tunneling, DNS exfiltration, and command-and-control communication
channels.
2. Design and implement a real-time detection mode that identifies the DNS-based attacks
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based on the Payload Analysis module. This module parses, extracts, and analysis cap-
tured fully qualified domain name (FQDN) queries from clients to determine whether
malicious or not.
3. Design and implement an offline detection mode to distinguish abnormal activity within
the DNS traffic. This module works based on two modules: the visualization and the
machine learning-based detection modules. The offline detection mode feeds the system
with DNS traffic based on a specific window period, every x minutes, to determine
whether the DNS traffic contains an attack.
4. Implement and design a network-based solution, DNS proxy server, that combines the
two detection modes in order to detect and prevent DNS-based attacks. The network-
based solution in this work aims to provide DNS services as well as the detection and
prevention in high accuracy, scalability, and efficient manner.
5. Compare and evaluate a set of performance metrics with different detection systems
or previous research work.
1.4 Contributions
The contributions of this work include a visualization system, a machine learning-
based detection system, and a comprehensive detection system that acts as a DNS proxy
server for identifying DNS-based attacks. The contributions of this work include: (1) A fast
and scalable visualization system for recognizing DNS tunneling attacks using the parallel
coordinates technique. This module is able to distinguish between normal and malicious DNS
traffic. (2) Identifying four different graphical patterns of real-world DNS tunneling attacks
by analyzing the DNS tunneling traffic based on different scenarios. (3) Designing a module
that employs a machine learning classification to predict DNS-based attacks that trained
and tested by comparing the graphical representation signatures of the measured network
traffic features with the previously developed DNS tunneling attack graphical patterns. (4)
Designing a real-time detection module based on the payload analysis to detect DNS-based
attacks in real-time. This module works based on malicious DNS-based characteristics. This
module achieved high accuracy and no false-negatives values with low false-positives rate.
(5) Implementing detection and prevention mechanisms against DNS-based attacks by using
the concept of DNS proxy that includes and combines the presented modules in this work.
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(6) Designing a system to detect DNS tunneling attacks that achieves a high accuracy of
99.8% and no false negatives with a low false-positives rate of less than 0.02%. The system
performs better than the commonly used Snort Intrusion Detection System (IDS), and the
detection system in this work to determine which system obtained better performance and
results against various DNS-based attacks.
1.5 Dissertation Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the related
work to the visualization and detection systems of DNS tunneling attacks. Chapter 3 de-
scribes the methodology of the visualization and detection module and the evaluation of the
visualization and detection module, which is discussed. The machine learning-based detec-
tion module is presented in Chapter 4 and its evaluation and results. Chapter 5 includes the
DNS proxy detection system, which combines all detection modules as well as the real-time
analyzer module. The evaluation and the results of the DNS proxy detection system are




Sensitive data theft is now one of the most severe risks for organizations and service
providers involving man-in-the-middle attacks [16] or malware that leaks data overt a cover
channel [17]. Although many organizations have deployed traditional security systems such
as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and proxies, there are still high-profile data breaches
that occur. Marriott International announced on November 2018 that it had been the victim
of a data breach in which the information for approximately 500 million clients had been
stolen [18]. The breach occurred on Starwood brand support systems starting in 2014. The
breach was not discovered until September 2018 [18]. In 2016, Yahoo announced that it was
the victim of the greatest data breach in history. The attack compromised approximately
one billion user accounts, real names, email addresses, birth dates, passwords, and telephone
numbers [19].
The SANS data protection survey revealed in 2017 that 12% of business organizations
surveyed recorded a security breach and 43% of these breaches involved data exfiltration that
was executed over the DNS [20]. DNS is one of the essential elements of the Internet archi-
tecture, and the primary purpose of it is to provide a lookup mechanism to resolve domain
names to IP addresses and vice-versa. Given that DNS is not intended for arbitrary data ex-
change via the protocol, individuals and organizations do not pay attention to security issues
in DNS which makes malware masters of abusing the DNS to cover their activities within
the networks. Previously, botmasters and hackers were using IRC as communication chan-
nels for their bots to avoid various network defense borders [21]. However, nowadays, DNS
protocol is being used instead for several reasons: DNS is allowed in almost every network,
rarely monitored, and network administrators do not pay attention to secure it. In 2017,
Cisco Security revealed that 91% of malware used the DNS protocol for communications,
and 68% of organizations did not to monitor DNS traffic [22]. According to SonicWall’s
Internet security report, in the first half of 2019, there was an increase in the number of
malware attacks by 4.8 billion [23]. Based on these Internet security reports, the current
real-time detection and prevention systems of malware attacks are not sufficiently capable.
Thus, there is still a need in building a robust real-time detection and prevention system in
order to decrease the risk against such attacks.
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2.1 Detection of DNS attacks
Compared to other protocols, the monitoring of the DNS protocol does not get much
attention in the literature. However, there is research on monitoring and the analysis of
DNS service without focusing on the DNS tunneling attack as done in this work. The
authors in [24] gathered DNS responses data including squatter domains, fast flux domains,
and domains being abused by a spammer of the University of Auckland and stored the
data into an SQL database for analyzing and detecting unusual behavior. Their research
focuses on analyzing DNS traffic to detect spam attacks using statistical analysis instead of
visualization. They used the Microsoft Strider URL Tracer, which helps users to investigate
third-party domains to crawl data. In this way, they detect that the client has already
visited a malicious domain name and has already been compromised. In [25], the efficient
detection method of suspicious DNS traffic by resolver separation per application program is
proposed. Their approach is based on making further investigation easy by a separate DNS
resolver based on the application program. The DNS requests that are sent from Internet
Explorer or any registered application are forwarded to a regular DNS resolver while all other
unregistered applications’ requests are forwarded to a more secure DNS resolver that inspects
DNS traffic. The authors point out that this approach helps system to filter out and monitor
the suspicious DNS traffic from unknown resources. The proposed system is implemented
and tested on the Windows operating system, and it requires installing a Perl module on each
endpoint computer to forward DNS redirect traffic to a DNS proxy. As a result, the proposed
system was able to forward the DNS queries based on application correctly, and it was able
to register the client by mapping the DNS queries with the respective application program.
However, this work has some limitations. The user must manually register the applications
to be well-known in their system. They also define the suspicious DNS traffic as queries that
are sent from not registered official applications in the DNS proxy. The proposed method
only supports Windows operating system only. It also hard to register an application that
uses multiple processes. In addition, attackers or malware creators can bypass this method
by using code injection techniques or DLL injection to insert malicious code into any of the
well-known processes. This work is evaluated based on forwarding the DNS requests only
as they mentioned in future work. They are planning to evaluate their system against real
malware. In [26], the authors described and evaluated a proposed solution for detecting DDoS
attack amplifiers attacks, which is mainly designed to efficiently protect the local DNS servers
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against rogue DNS servers. Further experimental results showed that it is efficient and can
be easily fit correctly into any network domain. The proposed system in [4] works as passive
DNS that monitors all DNS requests, including queries and responses, and detects payload
distribution channels that are established within DNS messages using a DNS zone analysis
profile module. Their detection module works based on all TXT records that have been
captured, divided and aggregated based on one day period. In parallel, their system stores a
copy of the captured data using the passive DNS channel in a database for future use. Three
datasets have been used to evaluate their work: one month of passive DNS traffic, a passive
DNS database, and a one-year malware database. Their experimental results show that the
proposed system was able to find different malware that leverage DNS for their data transfer.
However, the proposed system has several limitations. For example, the author decided to
captured only DNS traffic that has TXT recoded to detect the payload distribution channels.
In [27], the authors presented a comparative performance evaluation of DNS tunneling tools,
and they showed that different tools are able to use not only TXT but also different types
of DNS records in order to perform the DNS tunneling attacks. Botmasters or malware
creators can bypass the proposed system by using their name servers or other open DNS
resolvers which are not captured by the passive DNS sensors. As they mentioned in the
paper, the proposed system could be configured to run in real-time. However, the system
captured and aggregated DNS traffic in a time-based window, of one-day. Therefore, by that
time, malware can completely transfer sensitive data outside the organization.
2.2 Detection DNS Tunneling attacks
The DNS tunneling attack introduced in this work is a significant concern in cy-
bersecurity. As mention in [28], the attack can be divided into three subcategories where
attackers can abuse the DNS protocol: Data exfiltration, DNS tunneling, and command &
control. Data exfiltration is the simplest type of the attack where each DNS packet encap-
sulates information and then reconstructs this information on the attacker’s authoritative
DNS server. The main difference between data exfiltration and the other subcategories is
that the communication channel is uni-directional. This type of attack is difficult to detect
because there is no need to reply to the initial request as this attack transfers sensitive data
outside the organization’s network. Data exfiltration is often referred to as low throughput
exfiltration [2]. Next, the DNS tunneling attack is intended to encapsulate other protocols
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such as HTTP or FTP within the DNS requests. Compared to data exfiltration, this attack
requires a high frequency and volume of DNS traffic that produces easily identifiable traffic
pattern. The DNS tunneling attack is often referred to as high throughput tunneling [2].
Finally, the command & control, C&C, communication channel provides the attacker the
ability to take full control of a victim computer by sending commands and receiving the cor-
responding result over the DNS protocol. C&C channels provide an attacker with the means
to communicate with their malware after it has infected a victim [28]. Many open-source
DNS tunneling tools were designed to perform the attack such as iodine, dns2tcp, DeNiSe,
dnscapy, heyoka, fraud-bridge, dnscat, and dnscat2 [9]. Moreover, several types of malware
were discovered that use DNS tunneling for establishing difficult to detect C&C channels for
bot communications over the DNS protocol. The malware described in [29] and [30] uses
DNS queries and responses to execute commands and control compromised machines over
the DNS protocol. Therefore, securing them is essential.
2.3 Detection IDS/IPS systems
Intrusion Detection System and Intrusion Prevention System (IDS/IPS) appliances
detect and/or mitigate Internet attacks including DNS tunneling attacks using signatures
or by packet inspection. Farnham & Atlasis, 2013 described detection methods including
attributes payload analysis and traffic analysis [9]. They also provided Snort custom rules
based on entropy and statistical analysis. Like viruses which can be designed to avoid
anti-viruses products by manipulating the virus behaviors and signatures, attackers also
can deploy DNS tunneling attacks with previously unseen signatures to bypass IDS/IPS
appliances. Packet inspection devices such as IPS’s also have the ability to detect DNS
tunneling attacks, but those products require high-speed computing machines to process the
analysis which is expensive. Previous research proposed various approaches for detecting
botnet and malware that uses the DNS protocol in their communications. The work in [31]
conducted a classification of botnet detection techniques based on DNS traffic characteristics,
including the honeynet-based and the IDS-based approaches. The first is usually deployed
to collect information and analyzed it in order to understand the behavior and the attributes
of botnets. The proposed system in [32] is an example of honeypot which is designed for
tracking amplification DDoS attacks. They deployed 21 honeypots in different locations so
that they can get more information about such an attack. Most of the attacks are short-
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lived, with most of the victims being attacked once. They also show that 96% of the attacks
had the same source. In [33], Ramachandran et al. proposed a DNS-based blackhole list
(DNSBL), which is an example of a botnet detection system based on a signature. In their
paper, the authors developed techniques and heuristics that detects DNSBL reconnaissance
activity whereby botmasters perform for looking up against the DNSBL to check whether
their spamming bots have been blacklisted or not. Interestingly, as a result, they discovered
bots were performing reconnaissance on IP addresses for bots in other botnets. In [34],
Antonakakis et al. proposed the Notos system, which is a dynamic DNS reputation system.
This system assumes that the activities of malicious DNS have different features and can be
easily distinguished from benign DNS requests. The reputation score for a new domain is
calculated based on building models of known legitimate domains and malicious domains,
and they achieve this by collecting passive DNS query data and analyze the network and
zone features of domains. The system has been tested and evaluated using a large ISP’s
network with DNS traffic from 1.4 million users. The Notos system has been highly accurate
and achieves low false-positive rates. It has the ability to identify the new domain(s) before
they even get released to the public blacklist. However, signature-based IDS systems have
limitations. The proposed systems in [33, 34] and similar other systems are designed based
on blacklists. Moreover, maintaining the blacklist update of known malicious addresses is
not a simple task. Malware masters and hackers can easily avoid this kind of system by
registering a new domain to perform their activities [31]. In [28], the authors introduced
an issue of the data exfiltration over the DNS protocol. DNSxD is proposed to detect and
mitigate against DNS attacks, including data exfiltration, tunneling, C&C communication,
within the software-defined network (SDN) environment. Their approach to detecting the
low-throughput data exfiltration consists of two techniques. Traffic analysis (TA) is based on
volume and frequency of DNS requests within one-hour monitor windows. The deep packet
inspection (DPI) technique relies on inspection of uncommon record types, query length,
and query entropy based on threshold values. To evaluate DNSxD, the authors analyzed
the popular DNS data exfiltration attacks and current exfiltration detection mechanisms
within the Mininet network virtualization framework. The evaluation result demonstrated
that the proposed application was able to detect exfiltration based on different attacking
techniques. The big concern of this work is that DNSxD application was deployed within
the SDN environment, which is vulnerable to various attacks such as DDoS attack that makes
the network unavailable [22]. Next, the evaluation was performed using the Mininet network
16
virtualization framework, which is a network emulator that creates a network of virtual hosts,
switches, controllers, and links [35]. The authors in [36] demonstrated a method to deploy
Splunk, which is a commercial software that is used to index a large dataset and provides
keyword searching capabilities, dashboarding, reporting, and statistical analysis, within the
network and walked through steps to install external modules for enabling the detection of
DNS tunneling attacks.
2.4 Detection using Machine Learning
Machine learning is a method of data analysis that automates analytical model build-
ing. It is an important element of artificial intelligence that builds modules based on self-
study from input data, and make decisions with minimal human intervention to solve a
specific problem. There are three main categories of machine learning: supervised learning,
unsupervised learning, and semi-supervised learning. Supervised learning uses labeled train-
ing data and algorithms for building a classifier to predict labels on new data. On the other
hand, unsupervised machine learning uses unlabeled training data and constructs a classifier
based on learning and analyzing the data attributes. Lastly, semi-supervised learning is a
classifier that uses both labled and unlabled data to train the algorithm [14]. In [14, 37],
detection approaches based on DNS traffic are introduced using supervised machine learn-
ing. Hoang and Nguyen, 2018 evaluate the effectiveness of supervised learning techniques
in botnet detection based on DNS traffic, including k-nearest neighbor (KNN), decision
tree, random forest, naive Bayes. The evaluation result shows that the machine learning
algorithms produced a high detection accuracy of 90%, and they can be used effectively in
implementing a botnet detection system. Machine learning is being used for detecting var-
ious security threats including DNS tunneling, data exfiltration attacks and others. In [6],
the authors proposed an anomaly-based intrusion detection system using behavior analysis
approach to protect against cyber attacks. Using supervised machine learning, the proposed
method can distinguish abnormal behavior and detects the known and unknown DNS at-
tacks with a low false-positive rate. In their experimental results, however, the authors did
not provide enough information about the attack’s data set. Liu et al., 2017 proposed a pro-
totype system that detects a DNS tunneling attack using binary-classification based on four
behavior features including time-interval, request packet size, record type, and subdomain
entropy features [38]. Their results show that their system achieved a high rate of detection
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accuracy of 99.9%. However, the system was trained to detect only well-known tools which
are based on expected behavior, and an attacker can bypass the system by manipulating
these features. The authors in [39] developed a machine learning method of detecting DNS
tunneling attacks including information exfiltration from compromised machines and DNS
tunneling that was used to establish C&C servers. Their detection method relied on detect-
ing DNS tunneling attacks that use TXT records only. However, adversaries can bypass
the detection of this method by performing the attack using different techniques and DNS
records [27]. In [9], the authors discussed DNS tunneling attacks and its tools that use
common and uncommon types of DNS records such as A, AAAA, CNAME, NS, TXT, MX,
SRV and NULL [27]. Nadler et al., 2019 proposed a novel approach for detecting and deny-
ing both DNS tunneling attacks and low throughput data exfiltration over the DNS using
machine learning techniques [2]. There are three main phases for performing their approach.
The initial phase starts by collecting and grouping the DNS data log per domain name for
an extended period of time. The next phase is extracting features based on querying be-
havior of each domain name. Finally, a classification phase, which is conducted using the
isolation forest algorithm, is used to determine whether the domain name was used for data
exfiltration. Based on the classification model results, DNS queries and responses from or to
these malicious domains will be blocked. They performed the approach on large-scale DNS
traffic, DNS tunneling tools traffic, well-known malware traffic, and sensitive data that was
injected into the dataset to evaluate their work. As a result, the system detects the attacks
with a false positive rate of less than 0.002% [2]. However, the proposed method does not
work in real-time, requiring time for collecting data to detect the low throughput malware
traffic. During the collection phases, an attacker can use the DNS exfiltration technique and
transfer sensitive data over the DNS.
2.5 Detection using Visualization
(Choi, Lee, & Kim, 2009) developed a comprehensive and useful tool for visualizing
and detecting network attacks using the parallel coordinates technique [13]. Nine signatures
were defined, one for each attack [13]. The types of attack included portscan, hostscan, worm,
source-spoofed denial-of-service (DoS), backscatter, and network and signal DoS attacks. In
addition, they developed a detection mechanism based on a hash algorithm. However, the
authors did not include DNS tunneling as one of the Internet attacks. In [10], the authors
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focused on visualizing network attacks such as botnets that cause various types of attacks
such as DDoS, spam, and others. The visualization system was developed to provide visual
information which helps in detecting botnet attacks using DNS traffic. The parallel coor-
dinates technique, a common way of visualizing high-dimensional geometry and analyzing
big and multi-dimensional data, was used to represent three different DNS parameters in
real-time. Four graphical patterns were defined in that visualization system [10, 11]. In
[40], a fast and scalable visualization system for detecting and identifying DNS tunneling
attacks is proposed based on the parallel coordinates technique. The visualization system
was developed to provide visual information which helps in detecting botnet attacks using
DNS traffic. One week of data was analyzed to study the normal behavior of DNS, and
it was compared to the behavior during a tunneling attack. Six DNS parameters for the
parallel coordinates technique were identified and used to visualize the DNS traffic using
the parallel coordinates technique in order to distinguish between regular DNS traffic and
malicious traffic containing DNS tunneling attacks. Four different DNS tunneling patterns
were identified, each representing different types of DNS tunneling attacks using the parallel
coordinates technique [40]. In [41], Born and Gustafson (2010) introduced the NgViz tool
that combines a visualization technique with N-gram analysis to examine and show DNS
traffic from any suspicious activities. N-gram is used in text mining and natural language
for processing tasks such as predicting the next item in a sequence. Their method compared
a given input file of domain names with fingerprints of legitimate traffic. It is important to
note that in this research, the authors supplied the comparison input of domain names and
fingerprint of legitimate files manually.
2.6 DNSSec
To overcome some of the security issues related to the DNS protocol, DNS has had
many improvements over the years, and there are significant changes in the protocol were
made, such as the randomization of the source port and transaction ID to prevent the
DNS cache poisoning attack, which redirects network clients to malicious servers. Moreover,
Eastlake and Kaufman (1997) implemented DNSSec by the Internet Engineering Task Force
[42]. DNSSec is an additional security layer added to the existing DNS protocol. The
primary concept of designing it was based on the chain of trust that applies the concept of
public key cryptography for achieving origin authentication and data integrity on the replied
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DNS requests and verifying the non-existence of a domain, which makes DNSSEC effective
against types of cache-poisoning attacks [43]. However, some of its limitations have been
discussed in [44]. This solution is not sufficient for every network because DNSSec increases
the amount of network traffic. It also comes with other issues such as broken validations
which may cause a denial of service.
Even though some research has been conducted regarding approaches for detecting
and identifying the DNS tunneling attack, some issues still deserve further attention. IDS
and IPS detection techniques are based on pre-defined signatures by observing events and
identifying patterns which can be applied on the signatures of known tools and attacks. One
of the presumptions of the machine learning methods used for detecting malicious activities
in traffic is to compare the characteristics of traffic with DNS tunneling with the normal
DNS traffic even though some of the well-known tools are generating tunneled traffic similar
as possible to the regular DNS queries [38].
The next chapter describes the methodology and evaluation of the work. It includes
a description of the visualization module and how graphical representations of different DNS
tunneling attacks are generated, a description of the detection module, and a description of
how the system will be evaluated and metrics to measure the performance of the system.
Finally, it provides initial results of the visualization module.
20
3 Visualization of DNS Tunneling Attacks
The Domain Name System (DNS) is considered one of the most critical protocols
on the Internet. The DNS translates readable domain names into Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses and vice-versa. The DNS tunneling attack uses DNS to create a covert channel for
bypassing the firewall and performing command and control functions from within a com-
promised network or to transfer data to and from the network. There is work for detecting
attacks that use DNS but little work focusing on the DNS tunneling attack. In this chapter,
we introduce a fast and scalable approach, using the parallel coordinates technique, visualiz-
ing a malicious DNS tunneling attack within the large amount of network traffic. The DNS
tunneling attack was performed in order to study the differences between the normal and
the malicious traffic. Based on different scenarios, four different DNS tunneling graphical
patterns were defined for distinguishing between normal DNS traffic and malicious traffic
containing DNS tunneling attacks. Finally, the visualization system was able to visualize
the DNS tunneling attack efficiently for the future work of creating an efficient detection
system.
3.1 Introduction
Visualization is not a new concept for monitoring network traffic. There are several
papers that used the parallel coordinates technique to monitor and visualize network traffic.
There are various benefits of using a parallel coordinates technique. First, it is scalable. It
helps to represent a considerable amount of data in an efficient manner which makes analyz-
ing big data more simple and powerful. Second, there is no limit on the number of values for
representing an attack using the parallel coordinates technique that converts multidimen-
sional data into two dimensions. Therefore, using the parallel coordinates technique gives
the ability to represent more than three different values within a two-dimensional space. In
this way, the relationship between the results can be reviewed quickly showing prominent
trends, correlations, and divergence from the raw data. Finally, the visualized data using
the parallel coordinates technique does not include any bias for any column within the space
[12, 13]. In other words, every visualized feature has the same weight.
The contributions of this chapter are: (1) A fast and scalable visualization system
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is proposed for recognizing DNS tunneling attacks using the parallel coordinates technique.
The proposed system is able to distinguish between normal and malicious DNS traffic. (2)
A real-world DNS tunneling attack is conducted within our network to study the behavior
of the attack traffic. Four different graphical patterns are defined in this work by analyzing
the DNS tunneling traffic based on different scenarios.
3.2 Visualization System Design
In this section, we describe the system architecture design of a visualization system for
visualizing and identifying the Domain Name System (DNS) tunneling attacks using attack
patterns as shown in Figure 3.1. The visualization system consists of three main components:
Parser, Analyzer, and Visualizer. DNS data can be passively captured at the network edge or
it could be read from existing PCAP files. The Parsing was coded in the Go programming
language that interfaces with the TCPDUMP library for collecting the data quickly and
efficiently. The captured packets are filtered to provide all User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
packets on port 53. Note that DNS can also use TCP port 53 for things such as zone
transfers but it was decided to only capture the more common DNS traffic that uses UDP.
Performance is one of the essential factors necessary for this system. Therefore, the focus is
on the DNS response data sent by the DNS server that confirms the communications between
the local computer and the local or global DNS servers. Another reason why DNS response
packets were considered, is that it decreases the number of captured packets, resulting in
faster computations. The DNS response packets have a significant amount of information.
Therefore, it was found that a subset of information could be used to visualize and identify
DNS tunneling attacks and the parameters include the ID, domain and subdomain names,
TTL (Time To Live), source and destination IP, date and time. This DNS data is stored in
a database or file as input into the Analyzer.
Next, the Analyzer retrieves the captured DNS data from the database. First, it
checks that the captured data is a proper DNS packet to avoid further issues. Then, the
Analyzer filters the data to eliminate duplicate records based on the ID number and it applies
analytical and mathematical functions on the captured data. For instance, it gets the number
of requests for each domain name based on date and hours and sorts them by decreasing
values. It selects the top five domain names that have the most frequent requests, and it
compares them to the value of the threshold. If any of these values exceed the threshold,
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Figure 3.1: System Architecture Design
then it considers it as a thread. The Analyzer module sends the suspicious domain names
to the Visualizer.
Finally, the Visualizer displays the analyzed data using the parallel coordinates tech-
nique. This technique uses each coordinate to represent the six different parameters: source
and destination IP address, domain and subdomain names, TTL, and the time. For ex-
ample, assume that a workstation with 192.168.0.1 IP address sends a DNS request to the
global google DNS server that has 8.8.8.8 IP address to resolve the following domain name
www.attacker.com. Then, the Visualizer module represents the source coordinate with the
local workstation IP address 192.168.0.1, the destination coordinate as 8.8.8.8, attacker as
the domain name value, and www as a subdomain name value. If we have thousands of
requests, the visualization system displays a funnel-like pattern.
3.3 Graphical patterns for DNS tunneling attacks
In this section, the parallel coordinates technique is introduced that uses the captured
data to represent the DNS tunneling as graphical patterns. Four DNS tunneling attack pat-
terns are identified using the parallel coordinates technique, which can be used to both
identify and understand DNS tunneling attacks. Several tunneling tools were found that
implement the DNS tunneling attack, such as iodine, dns2tcp, DeNiSe, dnscapy, heyoka,
fraud-bridge, dnscat, and dnscat2. Each DNS tunneling tool uses a slightly different imple-
mentation of the attack. For example, dnscat2 uses a NULL for a particular request type,
while heyoka uses different encoding techniques to pass the data over the DNS communi-
cation channel [45]. However, all of these tools are using the same concept. Note that the
DNS protocol is not able to transfer large amounts data, only small to average amounts.
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Therefore, the DNS tunneling attack requires sending a considerable number of queries in
order to transfer the data and this leads to the ability to identify these types of attacks.
In the parallel coordinates technique, each coordinate represents a particular value.
The first coordinate is the source IP address which has the value of the computer that receives
the DNS query while the second coordinate is the destination IP address that forwards the
DNS request. The third coordinate represents the domain names, and the fourth coordinate
contains subdomain names. Then, the fifth coordinate is the TTL value that is set by the
Authority server which allows a DNS client to cache the answer for a particular time, while
the time is the last coordinate. With these values, our visualization system shows a graphical
pattern that can be matched to a template of the predefined graphical patterns of unusual
DNS traffic.
Suppose that an attacker compromised a computer within a network and he needs to
send stolen data out secretly without being detected by the firewall. The attacker can use
a DNS tunneling attack to hide his movements or to transfer data outside the network. In
this case, the attacker requires a pre-configured fake DNS server outside the network. From
inside the compromised network, he can connect to his fake server via the DNS protocol
that is allowed by the firewall in most networks. During the DNS tunneling attack, it sends
a tremendous number of requests to the DNS server within a short amount of time actually
transferring data instead of just sending DNS requests. In this work, we ran the DNS
tunneling attack inside our network and we transferred a 12 MB text file. During one DNS
tunneling attack, it generated a considerable number of DNS requests (52 thousand queries),
which is significantly more than normal. This kind of attack splits the file into small pieces
and encodes each piece with a specific encoding technique [9]. Then, it encapsulates the
pieces into the DNS packets to transfer it to the preconfigured fake DNS server that has
multiple preconfigured subdomain names.
The parallel coordinates visualization technique captures this unusual activity by
generating attack signatures using the number of requests for each parameter. For example,
Figure 3.2.A exhibits the previous scenario of the traditional DNS tunneling attack during
one hour where the source coordinate represents the value of the attacker’s computer which
is 192.168.0.1. On the destination coordinate, we can see that it has the value of global DNS
server and one domain name in the domain coordinate. However, we observe more than
52 thousand subdomain names, which shows an unusual number of DNS requests within a
short time. One of DNS tunneling features is that the fake DNS server sends thousands of
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DNS requests within a short time where it has a constant TTL value. The previous example
shows all 52 thousand requests have a TTL value of zero. Figure 3.2.B or malware scenarios
using the traditional DNS attack tunneling technique to hide their C&C communications
inside the network. It shows that we have many internal computers sending and receiving
many DNS requests within a short time. In [45], they presented the Heyoka tool which is one
Figure 3.2: Graphical Patterns for Traditional DNS Tunneling Attack.
of the DNS tunneling tools that not only performs the attack but it also has some unique
features that are not implemented in other DNS tunneling tools. Using Heyoka, an attacker
can deploy a master DNS server with multiple slave DNS servers. One could use a different
subdomain for each slave, crafting requests like the following: encoded-data.n.attacker.com,
where n is the slave identifier number. Therefore, Figure 3.3.C shows this case when the
attacker uses a multiple slave DNS server while Figure 3.3.D shows the case of using the
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Figure 3.3: Graphical Patterns for Heyoka DNS Tunneling Attack.




In this section, we show our experimental results of the experiments we performed
to evaluate the visualization system. The evaluation method consists of two main parts.
The first part is performing the DNS tunneling attack. The second part is importing the
captured DNS traffic data to the visualization system.
In order to perform DNS tunneling attack, we register a domain name and set up an
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Figure 3.4: Top Five Domain Name for an Entire Week without the Attack.
external server with a static IP address. Debian Linux server was installed and set up in
the cloud for this purpose. The DNS tunneling attack was performed using Kali Linux in
our internal network to encapsulate and upload a 12 MB text file to an external FTP server
during a weekday. Moreover, we also sniffed and monitored normal DNS traffic during regular
daily use for an entire week. There are two significant reasons for sniffing and capturing a
regular DNS traffic in our experiment. The first reason is to compare and study the normal
behavior of DNS traffic against the DNS traffic that has the DNS tunneling attack while
the second reason is to determine and set the value of threshold based on the normal DNS
traffic level.
3.4.2 Results
After performing the attack, the PCAP file was stored for the later analysis. Next,
using the Analyzer module, the captured data was analyzed excluding the DNS tunneling
attack as shown in Figure 3.4. We found that Microsoft.com is the value that occurs most
frequently in the data set, having 8836 DNS requests for an entire week and 170 requests
per an hour as a maximum value.
As shown in Figure 3.5, when implementing the DNS tunneling attack, the malicious
domain name has the most frequently occurring value with more than 50000 DNS requests
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and 40993 requests per an hour as a maximum value. It is imperative to note that the
attack has run for only two hours. This experiment was used to empirically determine the
threshold. In this environment, the sum of the number of requests of all domain names was
489 per hour. Therefore, the value of the threshold has been set to 500 DNS requests in our
experiment. It is important to note that the threshold has to be set appropriately for each
network depending upon the typical traffic levels.
Figure 3.5: Top Five Domain Names during the Attack over a Two-hour Period.
Next, the malicious domain name is sent to the Visualizer module to represent a
possible attack using the parallel coordinates technique. Figure 3.7 shows the visualization
of the entire captured network traffic that contains a DNS tunneling attack without the
thresholding technique turned on while Figure 3.6 shows the visualization of the network
traffic with the DNS tunneling attack with the thresholding technique enabled. As seen in
the figures, there is an obvious funnel-like pattern that appears during the attack with the
proposed technique. As shown in Figure 3.7, there are four values on the source IP address
coordinate which represent the internal computers where they requested too many domains
and subdomain names during the day. On the other hand, Figure 3.6 shows that only one
computer in the internal network sent too many DNS requests to resolve a considerable
number of subdomain names of an attacker domain name within two hours.
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Figure 3.6: Visualizer Module Shows only the Attack.
Figure 3.7: Visualize the Entire DNS Captured Data.
3.4.3 Issues
Several issues occurred during the initial design of the visualization system. First, the
entire visualization system had been coded using Python and Pandas which is the Python
Data Analysis Library [46]. Results were satisfying with a small number of data records
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but not a large number. As soon as our data set became larger, the system was not able to
process the data as efficiently resulting in slower turnaround times. The Parser module was
not able to process big PCAP files and a large number of DNS packets, and the Visualizer
module was taking more than 16 hours of processing time to analyze and display the data
on the parallel coordinates. Therefore, the system was rewritten in the Go Programming
Language [47] and the R Language [48]. After rewriting the code, 5GB PCAP files with
more than 52000 DNS packets are parsed in less than 12 seconds, while R processes and
presents the parsed data in approximately 5 seconds.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, a fast and scalable visualization system for detecting and identifying
DNS tunneling attacks is introduced based on the parallel coordinates technique. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first time that the DNS tunneling attack has been visualized.
Data was collected and visualized from an internal network during a DNS tunneling attack.
One week of data was analyzed to study the normal behavior of DNS and it was compared to
the behavior during a tunneling attack. In addition, based on our analysis, a method is pro-
vided to set the threshold value. Six DNS parameters for the parallel coordinates technique
were identified and used to visualize the DNS traffic using the parallel coordinates technique
in order to distinguish between normal DNS traffic and malicious traffic containing DNS
tunneling attacks. Four different DNS tunneling patterns were identified each representing
different types of DNS tunneling attacks using the parallel coordinates technique. Visual-
izations were created that are obviously very different so that they can be used in the future
for detecting DNS tunneling attacks.
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4 DNS Tunneling Attack Detection using Machine Learning
Individuals and organizations rely on the Internet as an essential environment for
personal or business transactions. However, individuals and organizations have been primary
targets for cyber-security attacks that steal sensitive data. Adversaries can use different
approaches to hide their activities inside the compromised network and communicate covertly
between the malicious servers and the victims. The domain name system (DNS) protocol is
one of these approaches that adversaries use to transfer stolen data outside the organization’s
network using various forms of DNS tunneling attacks. DNS protocol is considered one of the
most important internet protocol because it is available in almost every network, ignored, and
rarely monitored. In this work, our research focuses on implementing a reliable and robust
detection system against DNS tunneling attacks using visualization and machine learning
techniques. The detection system is able to detect DNS tunneling attacks, which are either
embedded in malware or be used as stand-alone attacking tools. The system consists of three
main modules: the Parser, the Analyzer, and the Detector. The visualization module’s
output will be input for the developed detection module that will use machine learning
algorithms to decide whether a DNS tunneling attack occurs. The system is trained, tested,
and evaluated using metrics derived from a confusion matrix that is commonly used to
measure intrusion detection systems’ performance. It is shown that the system is capable
of detecting the DNS tunneling attack with a low false rate and high accuracy. The results
show that all of the machine learning algorithms tested, including Decision Tree, Logistic
Regression, Näıve Bayes, K-Nearest Neighbors, Random Forest, and Support Vector Machine
classifiers, used in the experiment achieved 99% accuracy to identify the attack.
4.1 Methodology
4.1.1 System Design
The proposed detection system extends the work done in [40]. This work uses the
parallel coordinates technique to confirm the hypothesis that the visualization of DNS net-
work traffic using the parallel coordinates technique with an active DNS tunneling attack is
visually different from DNS network traffic that does not contain the attack. The visualiza-
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tion system was developed to provide visual information for detecting botnet attacks using
DNS traffic for communication. Six DNS features are used as parameters for the parallel
coordinates technique to identify and visualize the DNS traffic to distinguish between regu-
lar DNS traffic and malicious traffic containing DNS tunneling attacks. Four different DNS
tunneling patterns were identified, each representing various types of DNS tunneling attacks
[40]. The DNS tunneling attack signatures were derived from the work in [40] to implement
the detection system to label and prepare the machine language algorithms’ dataset. Also,
we evaluate the detection system on a dataset that was generated within the lab. The evalu-
ation method consists of two main parts. The first part performs the DNS tunneling attack
to create a dataset, and the second part imports the captured DNS traffic dataset to the
detection system. We employ the four types of attacks in our detection system and generate
relationship signatures for each one to detect and flag the attacks. Figure 1.4 shows the
original visualizations and Table 5.1 shows the attack relationship signatures. During the
analysis process, we used these signatures to label the data for training the machine learning
algorithms to detect the DNS tunneling attack.
Figure 4.1: The DNS Tunneling Attack Patterns
The visualization of the traditional DNS tunneling attack shown in Figure 1.4, plots
the quantity of source IP addresses, destination IP addresses, domain names, subdomain
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names, time-to-live (TTL) values, and time values. There is an easily identifiable pattern
that is converted to a signature represented as the tuple (1, 1, 1, m, 1, 1), which means
there is 1 source IP address, 1 destination IP address, 1 domain name, multiple (m) subdo-
mains, a single TTL, and a single or small window of time. The traditional DNS tunneling
attack, Botnet DNS tunneling attack, Heyoka DNS tunneling attack, and Heyoka/Botnet
DNS tunneling attack all have unique visualizations that were converted to attack relation-
ship signatures.
Table 4.1: DNS Tunneling Visualization Signatures
Attack Signature Representation Normal\Malicious
Traditional D. T. 1,1,1,m,1,1 Attack Type1 True
Botnet D. T. m,1,1,m,1,1 Attack Type2 True
Heyoka D. T. 1,m,1,m,1,1 Attack Type3 True
Heyoka /Botnet D. T. m,m,1,m,1,1 Attack Type4 True
No Attack Not Above 0 False
4.1.2 The Detection System
In this section, we discuss the design of the detection system. The detection system
consists of three main modules: The Parser, the Analyzer, and the Detector. DNS data
can be passively captured at the network edge or it could be read from existing PCAP files
via the Parser. The main goal of the Parser is to capture and collect a subset of DNS
information on the network edge and store it in the database. The Parsing module is coded
in the Go programming language that interfaces with the TCPDUMP library for collecting
the data quickly and efficiently. The raw captured packets are filtered to provide all User
Datagram Protocol (UDP) packets on port 53. Note that DNS can also use TCP port 53
for things such as zone transfers but it was decided to only capture the more common DNS
traffic that uses UDP. Performance is one of the essential factors necessary for this system.
Therefore, the focus is on the DNS response data sent by the DNS server to the local
computer. Another reason why DNS response packets were considered, is that it decreases
the number of captured packets, resulting in faster computations. The DNS response packets
have a significant amount of information. It was found that a subset of information could
be used in identifying DNS tunneling attacks and the DNS features include the ID, domain
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and subdomain names, DNS record type, TTL (Time-to-Live), source and destination IP,
SRV’s IP (Service IP), data length, and finally the date and time. These DNS features are
stored in a database or file as input for the next module which is the Analyzer module.
The next module is the Analyzer module, which cleans and prepares the DNS captured
data and then passes it to the next module. The Analyzer retrieves the captured DNS data
from the database, and it validates the data by checking the captured data to verify that
it is a proper DNS packet to avoid further issues. Then, the Analyzer module filters the
data to eliminate duplicate records based on the ID number and it applies analytical and
mathematical functions on the captured data. Examples of analytical and mathematical
function are calculating the number of requests for each domain and its unique subdomain
names, the number of source IPs per domain, the number of destinations of IP per domain,
the number of SRV of IPs per domain, the average number of subdomain lengths per domain,
the average number of data lengths of each DNS request per domain, and the average number
of TTLs per domain. The Analyzer module also generates the attack signature for each
domain and compares it with the malicious attack signatures to label the domain name as
malicious or not. Finally, the Analyzer module prepares the analyzed data and stores this
information into a file to pass to the machine learning algorithms to determine if there any
malicious domain names. Also, the Alexa and umbrella top 1000 domains [49] are used to
identify and label the captured domain name as legitimate.
Finally, the Detector module retrieves the prepared data and applies the machine
learning algorithms on the data to determine whether the DNS tunneling attack is occurring
or not. After retrieving the data, the process of this module is to prepare and split the DNS
data into two datasets: the first dataset is for training while the other one is for testing the
machine learning algorithms. Then, we train the machine learning algorithms on the dataset,
which has the labels, and finally, we examine the machine learning algorithms on the dataset.
The machine learning algorithms used in this work are the decision tree classifier, näıve Bayes
classifier, K-nearest-Neighbors classifier, Logistic Regression classifiers, and Random Forest
classifier.
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4.2 Results and Discussion
4.2.1 Evaluation
In this section, we discuss the evaluation method for the DNS tunneling detection
system. To evaluate the performance of the methodology, we created the normal DNS
dataset. Three months of DNS traffic were captured within the network. The network
environment is a home-based lab, consisting of more than 20 devices, including IoTs, servers,
mobiles, PCs, and laptops. There are two significant reasons for capturing regular DNS traffic
in the experiment. The first reason is to compare and study the normal behavior of DNS
traffic against the DNS traffic that has the DNS tunneling attack while the second reason is
to determine and set the value of the threshold based on the normal DNS traffic level.
Due to the importance of the DNS protocol, DNS tunneling tools were used to simu-
late the tunneling attacks using various methods. For example, the dns2tcp DNS tunneling
tool uses the TXT record types to perform the tunneling, whereas Iodine DNS tunneling
tool uses NULL records [50]. However, due to the lack of available DNS tunneling datasets,
we implemented and created a DNS dataset that has malicious DNS traffic. The DNS tun-
neling dataset includes various DNS traffic generated from DNS tunneling tools, including
Iodine, DNScat2, dns2tcp, and fraud-bridge. Finally, normal and malicious DNS datasets are
combined and then imported to the detection system and evaluated.
4.2.2 Experimental Setup
This work is a network-based solution which has the ability to distinguish and identify
between normal and malicious DNS traffic. In order to detect the malicious DNS traffic, we
require that the system intercepts the network DNS traffic. To guarantee that the system
captures all transmission DNS traffic, the plan is to place the system on the network edge
or to run it as a DNS proxy, which looks up DNS queries from a local cache. A DNS proxy
makes the process of resolving the domain name more efficient by performing the lookup
on behalf of the client and caching common queries. In addition, the detection system will
have the ability to read DNS traffic from an existing PCAP file, which helps to identify and
detect the attack offline from previously captured network traffic.
The DNS tunneling attacks signatures rely on the work that is done in [40], which uses
the parallel coordinates visualization technique to detect and visualize the DNS tunneling
attacks. The visualization system was developed to provide visual information that helps
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in detecting botnet attacks that are using DNS traffic for communication. The evaluation
process relies on two parts including: create the dataset that has the DNS tunneling attacks
and import the generated dataset into the detection system.
To perform a DNS tunneling attack, we register a domain name and set up an external
server with a static IP address. A Debian Linux server is deployed in the cloud for this
purpose. The DNS tunneling attack is performed using the Kali Linux distribution that
has many DNS tunneling attack tools built-in on the internal network to encapsulate and
upload a 12 MB text file to an external FTP server. Also, we configured a couple of local
domain nameservers to perform other DNS tunneling attacks to generate more data for
our evaluation. During the attacks, we captured DNS traffic as PCAP files. As previously
mentioned, we captured the normal DNS traffic on a three-month window to generate our
dataset for the evaluation process.
Figure 4.2: DNS Tunneling Tools
As shown in Fig 4.2, the five DNS tunneling attack tools that implement seven dif-
ferent types of tunneling attacks that were used in our research to generate and simulate
the malicious DNS traffic. Each DNS tunneling attack tool is performed for a specific time.
Figure 4.2 shows that the iodine-attack3.io domain name has the most frequency of DNS
requests among all the attacks, and that is because it was executed twice during the three-
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month window period. On the other hand, the number of requests to the dns4phd.me domain
name is performed a couple of hours during the attack to upload a text file via an FTP server
over the Internet while the other tools performed within a short time so that they generated
fewer DNS requests within the home-lab environment.
Figure 4.3: Top 25 Domain Names including DNS Tunneling Attack Tools
Figure 4.3 shows the top 25 domain names for the three-month window period, in-
cluding the DNS tunneling attacks. Note that the malicious domain names, which are
iodine-attack3.io ,dns4phd.me, iodine-attack.io, and iodine-attack2.io, are including the list
of the top 25 domain names of the most frequency DNS request for the three-month win-
dow period of capturing the DNS traffic. There are two methods that the detection system
feeds the machine learning algorithms with data include, capturing live network traffic and
importing PCAP files. During the evaluation, we used the PCAP file, which was generated
before, to import the data to the detection system. As previously mentioned, the PCAP file
has been captured data for a three-month window period. Note that we imported the com-
plete PCAP file at once to the detection system. However, our detection system is intended
to capture and import DNS requests for a shorter time in the future, making detecting the
DNS tunneling attack easier. For example, the detection system captures data every five




After performing the attacks, the PCAP files were stored for the later analysis. Next,
using the Analyzer module, the captured data was analyzed, excluding the DNS tunneling
attack. The frequency of the top 10 domain names is shown in Table 6.1. We found that
encipher.io domain name is the value that occurs most frequently in the data set, having
344776 DNS requests for the three-month window period while the youtube.com domain
name has the lowest frequency number in that list, having 68956 DNS requests.












We also analyzed the complete dataset to determine some dataset relationships be-
tween normal and malicious DNS requests. The Analyzer module marks the dataset with
two types of labels: No attack and DNS ATTACK, which helps the machine learning algo-
rithms train on this dataset with the labels and then tests them while excluding the labels.
Fig 4.4 represents the malicious DNS requests against the normal one. Our dataset has 3646
regular DNS requests; on the other hand, the dataset has 33 DNS malicious requests that
been generated using various DNS tunneling tools, as we mentioned earlier.
Even though we have only 33 DNS malicious requests, some of them were found in the
top 25 list, and that is because these tools generate a large number of requests per minute.
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Figure 4.4: The Normal and the Malicious DNS requests in the dataset
Thus, the number of DNS requests for two hours of performing DNS tunneling attack will
be higher than the three-month window period of capturing DNS requests.
The DNS Tunneling attack encapsulates the TCP protocol packets and sends them
over the domain name system. Due to the DNS protocol limitations, the TCP packets need
to be split into pieces to be sent with the DNS protocol. As a result, a successful attack
sends many DNS requests per minute in order to perform a certain task. Thus, to confirm
that we examine and study the DNS features of the normal and the malicious DNS requests
within our lab. Fig 4.5 shows the distribution of the overall total requests for the normal
and the malicious DNS requests for the dataset. This shows that the total number of DNS
requests with the DNS ATTACK label is much larger compared to DNS requests labeled
No attack and also have very different distributions. The different distributions demonstrate
graphically why the machine learning algorithms are able to distinguish between normal DNS
requests and malicious DNS requests.
We also observed the total number of the TTL average and the data length features
in both the normal and the malicious DNS requests. Fig 4.6-A shows the average number of
TTL in the DNS requests labeled as DNS ATTACK compared to the normal DNS requests.
We observed that the average number of the TTL in the malicious DNS requests is consistent
because the DNS tunneling tools use a fixed number of TTL values to send and receive DNS
requests. The average total number of TTL in DNS requests that labeled as No attack vary.
Similarly, we examined the average data length number between both the normal and the
malicious DNS requests. Fig 4.6-B shows that the average numbers in data length in both
are varied, and the main reason is that some of the DNS tunneling tools using the DNS data
feature to send and receive data during the attack. The distributions of normal DNS traffic
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Figure 4.5: The Total Number of the Normal and the Malicious DNS requests in the dataset
versus the DNS are very different.
4.2.4 Evaluation Metrics
In this section, the evaluation metrics for evaluating the detection system are defined.
Accuracy and effectiveness are essential factors in the evaluation process, which describes the
ability of the detection system to differentiate between intrusive and non-intrusive activities.
Confusion Matrix
The confusion matrix is a tool for determining the performance of the detection system
module. It contains information about actual and predicted classifications. Most researchers
primarily focus on evaluating and measuring the intrusion detection systems (IDSs) based on
the accuracy and effectiveness in terms of false alarm rate and the percentage of attacks that
are successfully detected [51]. Similarly, this work will evaluate and measure the proposed
system using the confusion matrix as defined below:
1. True positives (TP) - the number of intrusive activities that are correctly detected by
the detection system.
2. False positives (FP) - the number of normal or non-intrusive activities that are incor-
rectly identified as an attack by the detection system.
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Figure 4.6: The Total Number of the TTL and Data Length in the Normal and the Mali-
cious DNS requests in the dataset
3. True negatives (TN) - the number of normal or non-intrusive activities that are cor-
rectly identified as normal by the detection system.
4. False negatives (FN) - the number of intrusive activities that are incorrectly marked
as normal or non-intrusive by the detection system.
Figure 4.7 provides information about the confusion matrix of TP, TN, FP, and FN,
which represents true and false classification results.
Figure 4.7: The Confusion Matrix
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Metrics from confusion matrix
In this section, different classification measures that are derived from the confusion
matrix values are described. The confusion matrix metrics produce numeric values that are
simple to compute and compare [51], including true-positive rate (TPR), false-positive rate
(FPR), precision (PR), and accuracy, using the following formulas [14]:
1. True-positive rate (TPR) is a ratio between the number of true positives and the sum
of the true positives and false negatives. It is used to measure the proportion of actual
positives cases that are correctly identified as a DNS tunneling attack. Also, recall and





2. False-positive rate (FPR) defines as the proportion of negative cases that are incorrectly





3. Precision (PR) is the ratio of correctly predicted positive attacks to the total predicted
positive attacks. For example, consider an email spam detection system. A false
positive means that a non-spam email (actual negative) has been identified as spam
(predicted spam). The email user might lose important emails if the precision is not





4. Accuracy is the ratio of correctly predicted attacks, true positives plus true negatives,
to the sum of true positives, false positives, true negative, and false negatives. If the
system performance has a high accuracy value, then the system is considered as better
than a system with lower accuracy.
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + +FP + TN + FN
(4.4)
5. F1-Score defines as the harmonic mean of precision and recall models, and it is a
method of combining and weighted average of both precision and recall.





In this section, the results of the work are discussed. The aim of this research designs
a detection method that identifies and detects the DNS tunneling attacks from network
traffic. Our method starts by capturing the DNS traffic of the home-base network for a three-
month window period using the Parser module. The dataset has more than 3,500,000 DNS
requests before sending it to the Analyzer module. Then, the Analyzer module processed
the DNS requests and preprocessed the requests to filter the dataset to be ready for the
machine learning algorithms. The dataset is being used during the experiment. It contains
normal DNS requests and malicious DNS requests, with 3646 normal DNS requests and 33
malicious DNS requests that were generated using various DNS tunneling tools. Finally, the
Detector module splits the dataset into the training and testing dataset and then applies
machine learning algorithms to identify and detect any malicious activities within the DNS
traffic. The results shows that all of the machine learning algorithms that were used in the
experiment achieve 99% accuracy to identify the attack. Table 4.4 compares the machine
learning classifiers, including Decision Tree, Logistic Regression, Näıve Bayes, K-Nearest
Neighbors, Random Forest, and Support Vector Machine classifiers based on the precision,
recall, F1-score, and accuracy.
Table 4.3 shows the confusion matrix. The machine learning classifiers were trained
on 50% of the dataset, while the other part, 50% of the dataset, was used to test result
on these classifiers. During the testing phase, the dataset included a subset of the dataset,
which was selected by the classifier. The subset of the dataset was 1840 domain names,
including 1823 non-malicious domain names and 17 malicious domain names. Four of the
machine learning classifiers, Decision Tree, Logistic Regression, K-Nearest Neighbors, and
Random Forest classifiers, achieved identical results on the dataset in terms of the values
of precision, recall, and the F1-score. The results show that the true-positive value of these
classifiers was able to identify the 17 cases of the malicious domain names as a DNS attack.
At the same time, there were no cases identified as false-negative value, and 1820 cases
identified as normal domain names and labeled them as No Attack. On the other hand,
the result shows that we have three miss cases, false-positives, where the classifiers labeled
the malicious domain name as No Attack. Even though Näıve Bayes classifier achieved a
high accuracy which 99%, the confusion matrix result shows that there are missed cases
in identifying the DNS attacks. Näıve Bayes classifier was able to identify 16 malicious
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Table 4.3: The confusion matrix values for the machine learning classifiers.
ML. Classifier (TP) (FN) (FP) (TN)
NDecision Tree 17 0 3 1820
Logistic Regression 17 0 3 1820
K-Nearest Neighbors 17 0 3 1820
Random Forest 17 0 3 1820
Näıve Bayes 16 1 5 1818
Support Vector Machine 14 3 0 1823
cases out 17. In addition, the results show that the classifier incorrectly labeled one case as
DNS Attack. In the case of false-positive, the classifier was incorrectly labeled five cases as a
No Attack. Finally, the Support Vector Machine classifier was able to identify 14 cases of the
DNS attacks out 17, which means it three two cases. The Support Vector Machine classifier
had false-negatives, incorrectly labeling three cases as DNS Attack. It had no false positive
cases, and the true-negative values of shows the classifier identify 1823 cases as normal.
In addition, we performed other experiments of splitting the data into various ratios
and obtained slightly different but similar results. We trained the machine learning classifiers
on 30% of the dataset while the machine learning classifiers were tested by 70% of the dataset,
and we also obtained a 99% accuracy on all machine learning classifiers. The dataset that
been used for the experience had 1104 of Normal DNS requests and 11 of DNS attacks.
Most of the machine learning classifiers were able to identify all the malicious DNS requests
except the Support Vector Machine classifier was unable to identify all the DNS malicious
cases where it missed three cases out of 11 malicious DNS requests. In general, using such
a split of dataset ratio, the classifiers labeled one case as normal, but it was a malicious
request. In contrast, the Naive Bayes and Support Vector Machine Classifiers marked three
cases and labeled them as normal while was malicious requests. Next, we also split the
dataset into 70% for training purposes and 30% of the dataset for testing purposes, and the
dataset had 2552 cases of normal DNS requests and 24 cases of malicious DNS requests. We
obtained 99% accuracy as an average of all machine learning classifiers. Most of the machine
learning classifiers were able to identify all the malicious DNS requests except the Support
Vector Machine classifier was unable to identify all the DNS malicious cases where it missed
three cases out of 11 malicious DNS requests. Most of the classifiers missed three cases of
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malicious DNS requests, while the Naive Bayes missed five cases of malicious DNS requests.
The Support Vector Machine classifier did not miss any malicious cases, but instead, it
marked 9 cases as malicious DNS requests where were not malicious.
Table 4.4: Compared Results Among Machine Learning Classifiers
ML. Classifier Precision Recall F1-score Overall Accuracy
Decision Tree 0.85/1.00 1.00/1.00 0.92/1.00 99.836
Logistic Regression 0.85/1.00 1.00/1.00 0.92/1.00 99.782
Näıve Bayes 0.76/1.00 0.94/1.00 0.84/1.00 99.728
K-Nearest Neighbors 0.85/1.00 1.00/1.00 0.92/1.00 99.673
Random Forest 0.85/1.00 1.00/1.00 0.92/1.00 99.836
Support Vector Machine 1.00/1.00 0.82/1.00 0.90/1.00 99.836
Conclusion
To summarize, the machine learning-based detection system is a network-based solu-
tion that either passively captures all DNS traffic or reads DNS packets from existing PCAP
files to detect the DNS tunneling attack. It is based on the previous work done in [40] which
generates a graphical signature text representation that labels the dataset. The detection
system consists of three main modules: the Parser, the Analyzer, and the Detector, where
the Parser captures and feeds the system with DNS data. The Analyzer module prepares and
analyzes the data for the next module which is the Detector. The Detector module works
as a decision-maker built based on supervised learning and pre-trained objects, determining
whether or not the DNS tunneling attack occurs. During the experiment, we captured and
collected three months of DNS traffic within a private network and performed real DNS
tunneling attacks within a controlled private network to simulate the attacks. Then we used
these captured data and simulated attacks data to train, test, and evaluate our detection
system. As a result, the system achieves 99% accuracy to detect all simulated cases of the
attacks with a low false rate. In future work, we intend to implement a DNS proxy server
that aims to detect such attacks in real-time using the proposed system in this work.
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5 System Methodology
In this chapter, the detection system is introduced and discussed the system architec-
ture design and its main components. Our approach is a network-based detection system that
can identify and detect malicious DNS requests, including DNS tunneling, data exfiltration,
and command and control channels communications over the DNS protocol.
5.1 Background
The Domain Name System (DNS) considers as one of the most significant elements in
the Internet infrastructure. Many protocols and applications such as HTTP, email, and FTP
applications rely on DNS to resolve human-readable domain names to the corresponding IP
address. Due to the DNS’s importance, adversaries misuse and exploit the DNS protocol
in many various ways to achieve their malicious goals. Also, DNS-based attacks are one
of the most serious cyber-threats used to steal an online identity. According to a global
2019 DNS Security survey, 91% of malware uses DNS services to establish their cyberat-
tacks, and a DNS attack had targeted 82% of survey respondents in 2018 [15]. The 2020
global DNS threat report shows that the number of victimized and attacked organizations
via DNS-based attacks increased by 82%. Moreover, the report exhibits the top DNS-based
attacks, including DNS phishing, DNS-based malware, DNS amplification, and DNS tun-
neling attacks. DNS attacks and business consequences are explicitly interlinked, and there
are direct strong measurable business impacts. The report shows that such attacks targeted
various sectors such as healthcare, education, government, transportation, and utilities and
cost more than one million dollars as impacts on their businesses. This section introduces
the detection system, which is a network-based solution against malicious DNS requests.
5.2 DNS Proxy
The system detection approach is a network-based detection system that works as a
DNS proxy server between clients and public DNS servers. A DNS proxy server acts as a
regular DNS server that takes DNS queries from network clients and forwards them outside
the network into a private or public Internet Domain Name Server. One of DNS proxy’s
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advantages is that it has full control over the incoming and outcoming requests using either
whitelist or blacklist domain names for blocking certain domain names. It may also have the
ability to cache DNS records for speeding up the domain name lookup process. DNS Proxy
server features are available in almost every enterprise firewall appliance devices. In this
work, we used the DNS proxy concept to fully control the DNS queries and requests as well
as block the attacks as soon as identified and detected. The current state of the detection
system is to identify, detect, and block DNS attacks.
5.2.1 DNS Proxy as a Detection System
In this work, we used the term “DNS proxy” to implement the detection system.
Our Golang code is hosted on a dedicated server within the network to run as a DNS proxy
server to have a full control over the DNS traffic, including the incoming and outcoming DNS
queries. Therefore, in order to implement our methodology, there is a particular setup that
needs to be set. First, the network router needs to configure the DNS IP address section
to point to our DNS proxy server. The DNS proxy is placed within the home network
to intercept clients’ DNS queries. As soon as the DNS proxy receives the DNS queries,
it applies several analytical functions and then forwards it to the actual DNS server, the
Internet provider DNS server, or a public DNS server. After the internet provider DNS
server receives an answer, it replays it to the DNS proxy to send it back to the client, as
shown in 5.1.
Figure 5.1: DNS Proxy
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5.3 System Design
The detection system’s main purpose is to distinguish the DNS traffic’s abnormal
behavior and block malicious domain name requests. The detection system needs to be
built with multiple modules using different approaches and communication patterns in order
to detect both the DNS tunneling attacks and the DNS exfiltration technique, including
malicious software and Malware Bots. For example, in some cases, the DNS exfiltration
attack is used as the low-throughput DNS technique. The attacker sends a DNS request every
x minutes to exfiltrate sensitive data outside the organization’s network through security
appliances without been detected. In contrast, the DNS tunneling attacks method must use
the high-throughput DNS technique due to the communication patterns. For example, it
has to send and receive an enormous amount of data over the DNS protocol to establish a
VPN connection.
This section describes the network-based detection system’s system architecture de-
sign, consisting of two main analysis modules: The Payload Analysis (PA) and the Traffic
Analysis (TA) modules. As soon as the DNS proxy receives a DNS query from a client, the
first module, the payload analysis, intercepts and operates in real-time. The second mod-
ule, the traffic analysis, works every x minutes to parse, analyze, and detect the incoming
DNS requests, where x is configured based on the daily incoming traffic in the network. We
implemented two main analysis modules to detect most malicious DNS requests, including
low and high throughput DNS tunneling and exfiltration techniques, whereas identifying
and detecting low throughput techniques via payload analysis module in real-time and high
throughput techniques via traffic analysis module every x minutes. Fig 5.2 shows the DNS
proxy detection system’s architecture design, including the payload and traffic analysis mod-
ules.
5.3.1 Parsing DNS Data
The detection system works as a DNS proxy, which means it intercepts incoming and
outcoming clients’ DNS traffic. There are two methods for collecting DNS data to analyze.
The detection system feeds the modules with DNS data by either passively captured DNS
traffic at the network edge, via DNS proxy server, or read from existing PCAP files via the
Parser on the analysis module. When the DNS proxy runs, it analyzes the received DNS
queries via the payload analysis module for any malicious activities within the DNS requests
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Figure 5.2: The Architecture Design of DNS Proxy Detection System.
and then sends it back to the client. Meanwhile, it also passively captures the DNS requests
and stores them into a PCAP file to supply the traffic analysis module with DNS data for
further and more extensive analysis.
5.3.2 Feature Extraction
The DNS protocol’s nature design is to exchange specific information related to do-
main names [2]. It was not designed to transfer data over the DNS protocol. The DNS
protocol has various limitations, such as the length of any label of the domain name is re-
stricted to between 1 and 63 bytes as well as a full domain name is limited to 255 bytes of
letters, digits, hyphens, and separators are included [3]. Even though these limitations exist,
adversaries may abuse and leverage the DNS protocol to transfer data to their authoritative
name server and establish a covert channel for their activities. The attacker can include
as much information in the DNS queries to pass the data. Instead of sending legitimate
subdomains, adversaries take advantage of the domain length limitation and encode some
data in the domain name.
After parsing the DNS data for the system, the features are extracted to analyze.
Note that each module intercepts and examines the DNS traffic based on various features
and characteristics. Thus, in this work, it is required to parse and extract features for each
module individually. The payload analysis module monitors and analyzes based on features
such as length of DNS queries and responses, information entropy, uncommon record types,
blacklisted domain names, and statistical analysis. While the traffic analysis monitors the
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DNS traffic for other features such as the volume of DNS traffic per IP address, the frequency
of DNS traffic per domain, visualization of the traffic, the number of hostname per domain,
and other analysis features. Therefore, a set of features needs to be considered.
5.3.3 The Payload Analysis Module
The Payload Analysis (PA) technique focuses on identifying and analyzing critical
features of the DNS queries. It intends to focus on monitoring and observing the DNS
traffic that uses the particular patterns and indicators. Previous research and studies show
that malicious domain names can be found and represented in different forms and encoded
characters. This section describes the method of the payload analysis module approach.
Implementing the payload analysis module is to identify and detect the low-throughput data
exfiltration or DNS tunneling. One technique to bypass the firewall and in-place security
appliances is to use low-throughput techniques. The adversary sends a malicious request
every minute to avoid being detected. Adversaries use various data encoding techniques and
communication patterns in the DNS protocol to carries binary files, sensitive or stolen data
outside the organization’s network. Examples of data encoding techniques include MD4,
MD5, Base32, Base64, hex, and others. Thus, this section exhibits the approach used to
analyze and identify the DNS protocol for these techniques.
The Payload analysis module relies on DNS features, focusing on collecting and ana-
lyzing DNS query details, including statistical analysis and the information entropy. Thus,
we need to perform DNS feature extraction and examine them to detect if any DNS malicious
occurs. In the payload analysis module, the feature extraction phase works in real-time on
the network edge side, using a DNS proxy. Every time the DNS proxy server receives a DNS
request from a client, it extracts the DNS features for the analysis process. It then passes it
to the analysis module, which applies statistical and analytical functions to captured DNS
requests for analyzing to determine malicious activities. DNS features extraction includes the
Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN), query record type, a subdomain of FQDN, and the
subdomain’s query length, encoding the query data’s subdomain, blacklisted and whitelisted
domain names, and information entropy.
1. Uncommon record types: DNS Tunneling tools rely on certain types of DNS queries
due to the limitation of the DNS protocol [3]. As we mentioned before, the DNS pro-
tocol is not designed for transferring data but instead is used to exchange information
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about the domain name. Thus, the domain name system is limited to a certain number
of bytes of letters and symbols. However, that depends on the type of DNS query that
is being used. The DNS text (TXT) type record lets system administrators describe
the service of the domain name by entering human-readable notes. Therefore, many
DNS tunneling tools leverage the DNS TXT type record to transfer as much data as
possible. In this work, the detection system monitor uncommonly used record types
such as TXT and NULL.
2. Data Encoding: Adversaries take advantage of the domain name system to pass bi-
nary files, sensitive information, or stolen data over the DNS protocol. They most likely
include encoded or encrypted data in the domain name before passing it to make it look
like a part of the domain name request. For example, if the thepassw0rd.example.org
domain is queried, the adversary’s authoritative name server, for example.org, receives
the passw0rd as a string of hostname but interpret it as incoming data instead. Also,
adversaries may use some other encoding techniques to transfer text or binary data
to their servers. Another section that may have encoded or encrypted data is the
description section in the TXT requests. Therefore, the detection system monitors
the domain name system and looks for encoded or encrypted data, including Base32,
Base64, Based128, hex, md5, md4, and other Non-English characters.
3. Length of DNS query: The DNS tunneling tools utilize the domain names to transfer
as much data as possible over the DNS protocol. Therefore, the domain names’ and
hostnames’ lengths are considered abnormal behavior if they exceed a certain length
value, DNS requests’ lengths, including the length of characters and labels, the number
of dots. In a 2012 presentation at the RSA conference, Ed Skoudis identified a new
DNS-based Command and Control of malware that uses the DNS exfiltration technique
to transfer data over the DNS protocol [52, 53]. Based on that finding, they recommend
most of the Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDN) longer than 52 characters and most
hostnames that are longer than 27 unique characters should be considered suspicious
[52, 53].
4. Blacklisted and Whitelisted domain names: These lists are used to improve the
detection system’s results over time. We are filtering the capture DNS data using
blacklisted domain names to detect the malicious domain name before processing it
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for faster performance. Using the whitelisted domain names is to reduce the false-
positives rate of the results over time. As we show in the results chapter, we found
many use cases of legitimate domain names are using the DNS exfiltration to establish a
connecting channel between clients and servers to transfer data over the DNS protocol.
5. Entropy of hostnames: According to the DNS protocol RFC in [54], the valid DNS
requests must consist of English letters, digits, and hyphens. Therefore, the legitimate
domain name requests most probably could be found in the English word dictionary
while the DNS requests that have encoded names could have higher entropy than the
English words due to extensive characters [9]. In the article found in [55], the author
recommended using name entropy as one factor in detecting the DNS tunneling attacks
as the legitimate domain name and hostnames are using the English language that has
redundancy. In contrast, the encoded data of hostnames are long and have higher
entropy.
6. Statistical analysis: Another approach to detecting the DNS tunneling attacks is
by applying statistical functions on the captured DNS data. DNS tunneling technique
queries unique requests every time sending data to avoid getting cached by the browser
or the DNS server. Therefore, we applied statistical functions on DNS data to observe
the frequency of the specific characters’ occurrence. In this work, we also applied
statistical functions for both the payload and the traffic analysis modules, such as the
total length of FQDN and hostnames, the total number of labels in the FQDN, the
volume of DNS traffic per IP address, and the number of hostnames per domain. Also,
we find the frequency of DNS traffic per domain, hostname, source, and destination IP
addresses, TTL.
Figure 5.3 provides an overview of how the process of the payload module works, if
a client tries to browse xyz.example.com website. As soon as the DNS proxy receives the
DNS request, it extracts the feature of the DNS request for real-time analysis. It gathers
and analyzes some features, including query record type, query’s length, subdomain name.
Then, it passes it to the analysis module, which looks for abnormal behaviors such as infor-
mation entropy, blacklisted domain name, malicious query record type and length, abnormal
characters, or encoding data types within the subdomain name. Finally, it tags the DNS
requests as malicious and returns the result status of the DNS request to the DNS proxy to
process it.
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Figure 5.3: The Real-time Payload Analysis Module.
5.3.4 The Traffic Analysis Module
The traffic analysis module distinguishes and detects DNS-based malicious activities
on gathered DNS traffic. In this module, the detection system parses DNS traffic every
x minutes and analyzes it based on a visualization technique and machine learning. The
detection system works based on the DNS proxy concept, which controls the network’s DNS
queries and responses. In this module, we utilized the detection system module in [40] that
applies the parallel coordinates technique to identify and detect the DNS tunneling attacks.
The DNS proxy captures and stores the DNS traffic every x minutes. Then, it passes the
captured PCAP file to the traffic analysis module to process for further analysis.
This module detects the DNS-based abnormal behaviors where the DNS tunneling
tools are used to establish covert communication channels or VPN over the DNS protocol.
This technique sends a large number of DNS requests per second to achieve establishment,
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called the high-throughput DNS tunneling. In addition, this module has the ability to
identify modern attacks and tools. In some cases, adversaries use modern methods to bypass
the internal system’s security. For example, the PacketWhisper tool uses legit domain names
in the attack, making it more difficult to detect and exfiltrate sensitive data [56]. We show
more details about the results against PacketWhisper in the Results chapter.
Figure 5.4: The Overview of Traffic Analysis Module.
Figure 5.4 highlights the overview of the traffic analysis module phases. At the
moment the PCAP file ready, the traffic analysis module starts the process of analyzing.
First, the Parser is parsing the PCAP file and gathering the DNS required information for
the next stage. The DNS packet has much information; however, the traffic analysis module
parses and collects the following information: ID, source and destination of IP address,
domain name, subdomain name, Service IP (SRV) address, DNS record, data length, TTL,
date, and time. Figure 5.5 shows an example of captured DNS data during the parsing phase
in the traffic analysis module.
Figure 5.5: Example of Parsed DNS Data
Next, the analysis phase applies statistical functions on the captured DNS data for
each domain name individually, such as the average number of data length, TTL, subdo-
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Table 5.1: DNS Tunneling Visualization Signatures
Attack Signature Representation Normal\Malicious
Traditional D. T. 1,1,1,m,1,1 Attack Type1 True
Botnet D. T. m,1,1,m,1,1 Attack Type2 True
Heyoka D. T. 1,m,1,m,1,1 Attack Type3 True
Heyoka /Botnet D. T. m,m,1,m,1,1 Attack Type4 True
No Attack Not Above 0 False
main’s length, the total number of domain requests, source and destination IP address,
service IP address, and unique hostname requests per domain name. We also used the vir-
tualization module using the parallel coordinates technique in section x to generate relation
signatures that determine the DNS tunneling attack occurs or not. Table 5.1 show more
details about all kinds of attacks and their signatures. In the preparation phase, these signa-
tures were used to label the analyzed DNS data for a machine learning classifier for training
purposes and test and evaluate the machine learning classifier results. Also, the Alexa and
Cisco Umbrella top one million domains [49] are used to identify and label the captured
domain name as legitimate.
The visualization of the traditional DNS tunneling attack shown in Figure 1.4, plots
the quantity of source IP addresses, destination IP addresses, domain names, subdomain
names, time-to-live (TTL) values, and time values. An easily identifiable pattern is converted
to a signature represented as the tuple (1, 1, 1, m, 1, 1). That means there is one source IP
address, one destination IP address, one domain name, multiple (m) subdomains, a single
TTL, and a single or small window of time. The traditional DNS tunneling attack, Botnet
DNS tunneling attack, Heyoka DNS tunneling attack, and Heyoka/Botnet DNS tunneling
attack all have unique visualizations converted to attack relationship signatures. Finally, the
machine learning phase reads the prepared data to process it and provides detection results
for each domain name. In Chapter 4, we provide more further details about the machine




In this section, we discuss some of the detection system features. The detection
system is a network-based solution that identifies, detects, and blocks DNS-based attacks,
including DNS tunneling attacks and DNS exfiltration. This work aims to determine the
DNS-based attacks as soon as it happens in different forms, including the low-throughput
and high-throughput DNS tunneling attacks. We implemented the detection system to work
in two main modes: real-time and offline modes for better performance. The detection
system is coded using Golang programming language for fast and stable performance. The
detection system runs based on the Linux operating system and acts as a DNS proxy within
the network to fully control the DNS queries and responses. Thus, some traditional DNS
servers utilize blacklisted, and whitelisted domain names for blocking advertisements popup
windows, such as Pi-hole [57]. In this work, the detection system can also use the concept of
using blacklisted and whitelisted to improve the overall performance. The detection system
also has the ability to perform other services that the traditional DNS proxy provides, such
as caching domain names, which can cache DNS records for speeding up the domain name
lookup process.
Also, in this work, the detection system blocks malicious DNS requests after being
detected in real-time by caching and pointing the malicious domain name’s IP address to
0.0.0.0. in the DNS proxy. Thus, every time the malicious domain name is requested it
replies with the loopback address. We also implemented an API web interface for the de-
tection system that provides manual operations such as creating, removing, and modifying
domain name records within the cache system. This feature also will be used to design a
front-end web interface for future work.
In this chapter’s conclusion, we discussed the system architecture of the detection
system against DNS-based attacks. The detection system is a network-based solution, as a
DNS proxy, that targeting DNS tunneling attacks and DNS exfiltration techniques. Even
though the adversary uses the low-throughput DNS tunneling technique, the detection sys-
tem is able to detect and identify the attack. The detection system consists of two main
modules, including the Payload and traffic analysis modules. Thus, the detection system
monitors and examines the DNS traffic in real-time employing the payload analysis module.
It also performs offline analysis every x minute(s) using the traffic analysis module. We show
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more details about the detection system results and evaluation in the next chapter.
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6 Results and Discussion
In this chapter, we show and discuss the detection system results. The detection
system aims to detect and block malicious DNS-based attacks within the network. We em-
ploy two detection modes in implementing the detection system that targets DNS tunneling
attacks and DNS exfiltration. The real-time mode detects and analyzes the DNS queries
from clients, while the offline mode captures and analyzes DNS data for a certain window
period. Also, we compared the detection system results with Snort, the baseline intrusion
detection system. Snort is a real-time intrusion detection system, and it is capable of not
only monitoring and analyzing the DNS protocol but also other protocols against various
Internet attacks. The approach that is used in this work is a network-based solution against
DNS-based attacks, including the high and low throughput DNS tunneling attacks.
The network-based solution, which runs as a DNS proxy, consists of three main mod-
els: visualization, detection using machine learning classifiers, and real-time modules. Thus,
we performed three evaluation experiments individually for each module. DNS tunneling
attacks are widely used by either adversaries or malware applications. This type of attack
takes advantage of the DNS protocol, which is rarely monitored and accessible by most
networks, to bypass firewall and modern security in-line appliances. For example, during
our testing and evaluating experiment, a Firewalla was employed within the network. A
Firewalla is a modern security router to detect and block various Internet attacks. While
we were performing the actual attacks against the detection system, Firewalla could not
identify any of these attacks because it does not have the capability of monitoring the DNS
protocol.
The proposed detection system is implemented by using visualization techniques and
machine learning classifiers to distinguish the DNS-based attacks. Designing a detection
system using visualization and machine learning is not new. There are several studies on
visualizing network traffic. In addition, there are numerous studies on detecting most Inter-
net attacks. However, there are far fewer studies on DNS tunneling attacks and none of the
known techniques perform as well as the technique that is proposed in this work. Thus, this
section shows the experimental results for the detection system that we implemented and
compares it with others.
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6.1 Evaluation
The main focus is on building a network-based detection system for DNS tunneling
attacks and DNS exfiltration techniques. To build a robust detection system, we created
a local testbed environment to evaluate the system. To benchmark the performance of the
detection system, we tested both well-known and custom DNS tunneling tools against the
detection system. There are five main tools we used in this work. The five DNS tunneling
tools that were selected and used to simulate the attacks include iodine, dns2tcp, Pack-
etWhisper, DNSExfiltrator, data exfiltration toolkit (DET ), and Cobalt Strike. The idoine
and dns2tcp tools were used in the experiments to simulate the DNS tunneling attack where
the adversaries establish a covert channel over the DNS protocol, such as VPN connection.
Cobalt Strike is a stealthy advanced persistent threat (APT ) cyberattack that allows an
adversary to gain unauthorized access to a network and remain undetected for an extended
period of time. It is also defined as software for adversary simulations and red team opera-
tions for performing security assessments, while the DNSExfiltrator and DET are tools for
generating custom DNS exfiltration traffic that simulates malware scenarios. PacketWhisper
is a modern attack that uses the DNS protocol. PacketWhisper is a special case scenario
where the attacker is internal and performs the attack from in-site.
This work’s main benefit is to recognize and predict new threats with a low false-
positive rate and low latency. We calculate the performance evaluation based on three
metrics factors: Detection Rate (True-Positive rate), Precision (PR), and Accuracy (ACC).
Then, we compared the evaluation results with Snort, the open-source detection system. We
consider a system that has less false-negatives rate with high accuracy as better.
6.1.1 Experimental Setup
This section discusses the experimental setup for the DNS tunneling detection system.
To evaluate the performance of the methodology, we employ the detection system within a
local private network. The network environment is a home-based lab consisting of more
than 20 devices, including IoTs, servers, mobiles, PCs, and laptops. The detection system
is a network-based solution that runs as a DNS proxy to control and intercept the network
traffic. The detection system acts as a primary DNS server for all clients in the network to
guarantee that we intercept overall clients’ requests. The DNS proxy is capable of caching
DNS requests for faster query lookup. For this experiment, we run the detection system for
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four weeks to gather as much data for evaluating the system as well as we performed the
DNS attacks using the tools to simulate the attacks.
A Debian Linux server is deployed and hosted in the cloud to act as a public DNS
server, and all network clients are using the IP address of the DNS proxy as the primary
DNS server. The detection system uses blacklisted domain name lists which protects clients
from Internet attacks, including Phishing and spear phishing attacks. As we show in the
results section, we blocked many advertisement websites based on blacklisted lists which
been created by people.
Figure 6.1: An Overview of the DNS proxy Setup.
Figure 6.1 exhibits an overview of the experimental setup of the DNS proxy in the
cloud where clients use the DNS proxy as their primary DNS server to resolve DNS queries.
Then, as soon as the DNS proxy receives the DNS queries, it checks for exists cached domain
names to respond back to the client. If it does not exist, then it forwards the query to Google
public DNS servers to resolve the request. Finally, Google public DNS sends back the results
to the DNS proxy server, which sends the result to clients.
6.1.2 The Collected DNS Data
In this section, we discuss and describe the captured DNS data gathered during this
work. The network environment is a home-based lab that has more than 20 clients. The
monthly average network data usage is approximately 25 GB of Internet traffic, an active
and busy network. Figure 6.2 gives a clear insight into the network connectivity and data
transfer during the evaluation and testing of the DNS proxy server. This work focuses
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on monitoring and analyzing the DNS traffic and identify malicious DNS-based attacks,
including DNS tunneling attacks and DNS exfiltration. Thus, the DNS proxy server was
successfully deployed without any issue during the testing and evaluating period.
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Figure 6.2: Internet Data Transfer during the Four Weeks.
In this work, we used the DNS proxy server and targeted not only the DNS tunneling
attacks but also the advertisement websites that gather visitor information and may harm
clients. Once the DNS proxy server receives a DNS request, it looks up the domain name in
the blacklist. If it exists, then the DNS proxy server blocks the DNS requests. In addition,
the DNS proxy applies statistical analysis on captured DNS data for a certain date including
information such as total queries, total queries blocked, top ten domain names, top ten
blocked domain names, and top clients.
Figure 6.3 focuses and provides information about DNS queries for the four weeks
of the experiment’s detection system. Note that the number of DNS queries varies between
5000 to 60000 requests, where the total DNS queries is 1,148,018 for the four weeks of the
evaluation. The detection system was capable of blocking approximately 20% of the total
number of DNS requests based on using the blacklists. These statistics exclude the DNS
tunneling attack requests that we performed to simulate the attacks against the detection
system. In addition, Figure 6.4.B shows 10% of DNS requests that have been cached in
the detection system while the DNS proxy forwards and replies to 70% of the total DNS
requests.
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We also analyzed the DNS query types received by the DNS proxy server for the month
of testing and evaluation. Figure 6.4.A shows the top five DNS query types including: A,
AAAA, PTR, TXT, and CNAME where the majority of the DNS type is A (IPv4), while
the TXT received by less than 1% of the total DNS query types.
The captured data was analyzed, excluding the DNS tunneling attack. The frequency
of the top ten domain names is shown in Table 6.1. It showed that the encipher.io domain
name is the value that occurs most frequently, having 344776 DNS requests for the four weeks
of testing and evalulation while the youtube.com domain name has the lowest frequency
number in that list, having 68956 DNS requests.
Figure 6.3: DNS Queries over Monthly Time Period.
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Figure 6.4: Statistics of Queries Types and Answered by.
6.2 Threshold Value
The detection system consists of two detection modules: the payload and traffic
analysis modules. Each module uses a threshold value to determine the abnormal activity.
For example, we set the hostname’s threshold value of the full qualified domain name’s length
to be 30 characters long in the payload analysis module. This value is selected based on the
recommendations in previous work [1,2].
However, it is unclear what threshold value for the number of DNS requests to use
within a time frame window to identify malicious domain names for the traffic analysis mod-
ule. A threshold value is used in the traffic analysis module for machine learning training
purposes. After capturing the DNS data, we generate text representation signatures from
the visualization. If it is a malicious signature for a domain, we compare the number of DNS
requests of the domain name to the threshold value and then label the training dataset as
either malicious or not malicious base on the threshold. Thus, there is a need to conduct
hands-on experiments for selecting the most beneficial values for numbers of DNS requests
within the set period. The traffic analysis module aims specifically to identify and detect
high-throughput DNS tunneling attacks over time using visualization signatures and a ma-
chine learning classifier. This experiment is significant for the traffic analysis module and its
threshold value because it processes and analysis DNS data every x minutes.
This section presents an evaluation experiment to determine the best threshold value
for the detection system module, the traffic analysis module. Based on what we observed in
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the experimental results, there is an obvious way to select an accurate value for the detection
system’s threshold based on the binary file size and time. It is selected based on an empirical
experiment using DNS tunneling attack tools.
The DNS tunneling attack such as TCP over the DNS protocol is usually noisy and
sends a large number of DNS requests to establish communication channels. Therefore, for
these types of attacks the threshold can be set to be when the amount of DNS traffic is one or
two standard deviations above a moving average. Instead, we focused on the more difficult
problem of determining the threshold value for the DNS exfiltration technique scenarios.
The main reason is this type of technique is to send a specific number of requests depending
on the file size.
The tool DNSExfiltrator is used to simulate the exfiltration attack that transfers
files outside of a compromised network for empirically determining the threshold. Multiple
files varying in size from 1KB to 1MB were transferred outside of the network using the
DNSExfiltrator tool and the number of chunks representing DNS requests were measured.
The maximum full domain of 255 bytes and maximum label length of 63 bytes [3] were used
in this experiment. If the DNS request and label sizes were reduced to lower values, it would
cause even more DNS requests to be sent for a specific file size.
The threshold value is set based on the file size and number of DNS chunks in Table
6.2. We consider the time and the size as significant factors in this evaluation since the
training phase of traffic analysis module relies on capturing DNS data every x minutes where
setting x is based on the daily network traffic. For example, let’s assume that the adversary
wants to export a 100KB text file of stolen credit card information outside the organization’s
network using the DNS exfiltration technique. Table 6.2 shows that the 100KB file needs
600 DNS requests within 25 seconds to successfully exfiltrate it outside the organization
network. Then, our detection system needs to capture DNS data every minute, and the
value of the threshold needs to be set to less than 600 to detect the attack. In our detection
system experiment, we selected that the traffic analysis captures DNS traffic every 30 seconds
and set 100 as a threshold value assuming the attacker needs to exfiltrate a 50KB file at
least, resulting in approximately 300 DNS requests in 20 seconds. Note that sometimes the
adversary could use the delay technique between each DNS request to reduce the noise, but
the payload analysis module in this work is designed for these situations.
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Table 6.2: Exfiltrating Various Binary files Over the DNS
File Size Number of chunks Time Request size Label size
1KB 7 1 Sec 255 chars 63 chars
10KB 61 4 sec 255 chars 63 chars
100KB 600 25 sec 255 chars 63 chars
200KB 1199 43 sec 255 chars 63 chars
500KB 2996 1:53 mins 255 chars 63 chars
1MB 6135 4:00 mins 255 chars 63 chars
6.3 Results
This section shows the results of the testing and evaluation process of the detec-
tion system. The detection system is a network-based solution to detect and block various
DNS-based attacks, including DNS tunneling attacks and DNS exfiltration techniques. In
addition, the detection system blocks domain names based on blacklists that are related
to advertisement purposes. Most advertisement websites collect sensitive information from
visitors, and they also may harm visitors by injecting malicious codes into visitor browsers to
execute abnormal activities or redirecting them to malicious websites. The detection system
acts as a DNS proxy server capable of fully intercepting DNS traffic within the network to
control DNS clients’ requests.
In previous chapters, we showed the various modules’ results individually, including
the Visualization module and the detection based on machine learning. However, this section
presents the detection system results as one system where the Payload Analysis module runs
in real-time monitoring DNS requests. Simultaneously, the Traffic Analysis module works
in offline mode every x minutes based on the statistical functions. By the end of the results
section, we also show Snort IDS’ results, the open-source intrusion detection system, to
detect DNS-based attacks and finally compare our detection system’s results against Snort
to determine which detection system is better. The detection system aims to distinguish and
prevent DNS tunneling attacks and DNS exfiltration techniques. In order to test and evaluate
the detection system against malicious DNS-based requests, we simulate and perform real-
world attacks within a private and controlled network environment. In this work, we focus on
detecting various DNS-based attack scenarios, including TCP over DNS, DNS exfiltration,
and Command and Control (C&C) communication channels.
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Table 6.3: Tools to Simulate DNS-Based Attacks
Tool Simulate Scenario of Purpose
iodine TCP over DNS Establish VPN connection
dns2tcp TCP over DNS Establish VPN connection
DNSExfiltrator DNS exfilitration technique Exflitrate sensitve data
DET DNS exfilitration technique Exflitrate sensitve data
Cobalt Strike Command and Control Execute Commands
Cobalt Strike Command and Control Upload File
dnscat2 Command and Control Execute Commands
dnscat2 Command and Control Upload File
PacketWhisper Custom DNS attack Exflitrate sensitve data
Table 6.3 lists the tool, simulated scenario, and the main purpose of the attack. We
simulated all of these scenarios against the detection system in the testing and evaluating
stage. Note that in the TCP over DNS scenario, the adversary requires sending considerable
numbers of DNS queries which makes it noisy. While in the custom DNS exfiltration and
command and control scenarios, the adversary sends a limited number of DNS requests,
making it less noisy and harder for the detection system to detect it. The PacketWhisper
tool considers as a modern DNS-based attack that uses legit domain names in the attack,
making it more difficult to detect and exfiltrate sensitive data [56].
In the first section to the results, we show the blocking domain names based on ad-
vertisement blacklists. During the four weeks of using the detection system, we notice that
many companies, such as Google and Microsoft, collect data about visitors. Some of these
domain names that are part of gathering data are already in blacklists available publicly.
Thus, the detection system was capable of blocking these domain names successfully. In-
terestingly, Table 6.4 shows the top ten blocked domain names during the experiment and
evaluation period. We observed that Android TVs within the private network send requests
to secure-dcr.imrworldwide.com which is a tracking consumer habit. This Android TV sent
34254 requests which were all blocked.
Next, we performed that attacks where the detection system was in place. The
detection system acted as a DNS proxy server so that it could intercept all DNS requests
within the private network. We performed various scenarios of DNS-based attacks where
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all of the attacks were detected by the detection system successfully. The detection system
has two modules: the Payload Analysis (PA) module and the Traffic Analysis (TA) module.
In some attack cases, the detection system detected the attack using both the TA and PA,
while in other cases it detected the attack using either the TA or the PA.
6.3.1 Results of Experiment 1
This section shows the detection system evaluation results based on the confusion
matrix, including the accuracy, missing rates, and other measurements. We installed the
detection system in place of the active network during the evaluation, and the total average
DNS requests were approximately 1000 per hour. At the same time, we performed 12
actual cases of DNS-based attacks during this experiment, including TCP over DNS, DNS
exfiltration, and command and control. The detection system was able to detect all 12 cases
successfully with no false negatives value. The detection system identified the attack as soon
as received by the DNS proxy server by either the payload analysis or the traffic analysis
modules. Still, there are cases where the payload analysis module was not able to detect
the attack. The traffic analysis module distinguished the attacks based on the visualization
module discussed in Chapter 3.
There is a case, PacketWhisper tool, where the detection system has not detected the
attack using the payload analysis module but detected it with the traffic analysis module.
67








PacketWhisper is a combination of DNS queries with text-based steganography. It converts
the binary payload file into a list of FQDN. In this attack, there is no need for the adversary
to control a DNS server in order to receive the data; instead, the adversary sends the list of
FQDN strings as DNS queries within the network. This attack leverages the common website
domain names, which most of them found in whitelist domain names such as encoded-
data.cloudfront.net. Then, within the same network, the attacker captures the DNS requests
into the PCAP file and extracts the encoded payload from packet capture into the regular
file using PacketWhisper. Note that there is not a need to complete successful lookup. The
attack’s DNS requests look like non-malicious requests since the lengths are short and using
a whitelisted domain name. However, it requires sending numerous amounts of DNS requests
depending on the file’s size. Thus, the traffic analysis module can detect the attack.
Even though the detection system detected all attack scenarios, it identifies 20 cases
as a false positive, where the system recognizes them as malicious, but they are not malicious.
Interestingly, many big companies leverage the DNS exfiltration to communicate with clients
and servers. Thus, based on DNS exfiltration characteristics, the detection system finds
these DNS requests as attacks. Table 6.5 shows the most interesting top five false positives.
Nintendo sends DNS requests shown in the Table 6.5 every 30 minutes to communicate with
Nintendo’s servers. Similarly, BitDefender, the Internet security company, uses the DNS
exfiltration technique to send file signatures or scan results to update their databases. Other
companies such as Google, Sony, Amazon, and others are using this technique for either
statistical analysis about the client or send data to their servers.
68
6.3.2 Results of Experiment 2
The first experimental results show that there are a false-positives in 20 cases. How-
ever, most of the cases do have the malicious characteristics of our detection system module,
the payload analysis module. Nowadays, companies use the DNS protocol to build com-
munication channels for clients and servers. Thus, we conducted another evaluation of the
detection system to resolve this issue. The purpose of the second experiment is to enhance
and improve the false-positives rate over time. We solve this by maintaining and updat-
ing the whitelists of common domain names found in the network. Thus, this solution
requires monitoring the false-positives value of the detection system over time, every week,
to whitelist the domain names that are not malicious. The long-term goal is to have few or
no false-positives values by keeping update the whitelist of the detection system.
As a result, the evaluation results of the second experiment show that we improved
and reduced the false-positives quality, but we may have a new false positive, which means
we regularly need to maintain the whitelist domain name. During the second experiment,
the detection system identified all attack cases with no false-negative values, but still, there
are two new false-positives values.
6.4 Results
This section compares the proposed detection system with Snort, the open-source
intrusion detection system, to determine which detection system is the better against DNS-
based attacks.
6.4.1 Snort
Snort is an open-source intrusion detection and prevention system (IDS/IPS). Thou-
sands of professionals over the world maintain it to provide a secure network for free. Snort
is a deep packet inspection that uses various rules and signatures to identify and detect
malicious network activity, including DNS-based attacks [58].
6.4.2 Snort Setup
We conducted the identical attack scenarios performed against the developed DNS
proxy. By default, Snort IDS is not configured to monitor DNS protocol and to detect DNS
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tunneling attacks. We used signatures that publicly available to monitor and identify the
DNS tunneling attacks. Then, we compare the results based on confusion matrices values,
including the accuracy and missing rate.
We set up Snort using SPAN (Switched Port Analyzer) technique, which is also known
as port mirroring. SPAN is a monitoring network traffic method that enabled the switch
to send a copy of all network packets seen on one port to another port, where the packet
can be analyzed. Figure 6.5 shows the exact setup for the experiment. Snort is an intrusion
detection system that detects malicious network activities based on rules and signatures.
These signatures are generated by professionals from what they see in their daily work and
experience.
Figure 6.5: Environmental Setup of Snort.
Table 6.6 shows an example of Snort signature for TXT DNS type for detecting DNS
tunneling attacks. Snort monitors a specific UDP packet and header on port 53. Snort
tracks the sender source IP address by setting a threshold value for TXT DNS type requests
and counts 10 DNS requests within 5 seconds. Thus, this can easily bypass the rule if the
attacker is aware of it.
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Figure 6.6: Snort TXT Signature type for DNS Tunnelling.
Table 6.6: Compared Results between DNS Proxy and Snort




DNS EX. 1KB Yes No
DNS EX. 10KB Yes No
DNS EX. 50KB Yes Yes
Cobalt Strike Yes No





We conducted different scenarios of DNS-based attacks using Snort to detect the same
type of attacks within a private network. We configured Snort with varying rules that targe
TXT, NULL DNS query types. Snort detected only six out of 12 cases of attacks. Thus,
Snort misses 6 cases of DNS-based attacks that do not validate the rule specifications. Snort
is capable of detecting DNS-based attacks based on TCP over DNS scenarios and uploading
encoded files over the DNS protocol. However, it failed to identify DNS-based attacks based
on the DNS exfiltration technique and command-and-control technique, while not having
any false-positive cases.
6.4.4 DNS Proxy vs Snort
Table 6.6 shows the attacks detected by the DNS proxy using the techniques described
in this work versus Snort. There are six attack scenarios that Snort is not able to detect.
At the same time, the DNS proxy is able to identify and detect all attack scenarios. Snort
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was not able to detect most of the DNS exfiltration attacks with small files as well as the
command and control attacks.
Next, Table 6.7 shows three experiments’ evaluation results, including true-positives
rate, false-positives rate, precision, F1-score, and accuracy. DNS Proxy - EXP1 is the
first experiment as a detection system that does not employ the whitelisted domain names
in detecting DNS-based attacks. The DNS Proxy - EXP2 is the second experiment, the
improved version of the detection system that uses the whitelisted domain names to reduce
the false-positives rate. Snort IDS is the final experiment where Snort IDS is in place for
monitoring the DNS traffic within the network. We consider the system has higher accuracy
with fewer false negatives is a better detection system. The detection system scores 99%
accuracy, but it has few false-positive values in the two tries of experiments, DNS Proxy
EXPR1 and DNS Proxy EXPR2. Using the whitelisted domain names in DNS EXPR2, we
significantly improved the results in the second experiment and decreased the false-positive
values from 2% to 0.2%. The Snort IDS scores 99% accuracy with no false-positive values.
However, Snort IDS misses 50% of the attacks results in TPR of 50% and FNR of 50%.
Finally, Table 6.8 summarizes the comparison between the detection system and
Snort IDS. The table shows the significate difference between the two systems. First, the
detection system identified all cases of performed attacks, including the high-throughput and
low-throughput techniques. Snort IDS was able to detect only 6 cases of the attacks out
of 12, mostly the high-throughput. The detection system identified the attacks as soon as
it received. While the Snort IDS requires 10 to 15 seconds to detect the attack due to the
rules’ implementation. The detection system works as a DNS proxy that does not require a
special configuration or client action. In contrast, Snort IDS requires special configuration
such as a port mirror. Finally, the detection system provides DNS services, detection, and
prevention, while Snort IDS provides detection only.
Table 6.7: Comparison of Three Experiments Results
Experment TPR FPR FNR PRC F1 Accurancy
DNS Proxy - EXP1 1.00 0.020 0.00 0.375 0.54 97.9%
DNS Proxy - EXP2 1.00 0.002 0.00 0.85 0.92 99.8%
Snort IDS 0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.66 99.4%
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Table 6.8: The Major Difference between the Detection System and Snort IDS
The Detection System SnortIDS
Attacks 12/12 6/12
Time Nearly realtime 10-15 seconds
Configuration No configuration is needed Need a Special Configuration
Services DNS, Protection, Prevention Detection Only
This section highlights the detection features of the work in this dissertation com-
pared to prior research based on features used to determine the DNS tunneling and DNS
exfiltration. After evaluating the proposed detection system performance and validate the
method, we compare the proposed method to methods proposed in other published works
as shown in Table 6.9. We observed that most of the proposed methods focus on statistical
analysis methods, including query length, DNS record types, and volume of DNS requests
for detecting the DNS tunneling attacks. On the other hand, a limited number of works have
Table 6.9: Features Used in Detection DNS Tunneling and DNS Exfiltration
Features [9] [36] [38] [2] [58] [28] Our work
Statistical Analysis x x x x x
Query Length x x x x
Record Types x x x x x
Volume of Requests x x x x
Freq. per domain x x x
Host per domain x x
Machine Learning x x
Visualization x
Blacklist server x x x
Time interval x x x
DNS Signatures x





focused on detecting both DNS tunneling and DNS exfiltration using various techniques such
as machine learning. Note that none of the previous research works in real-time for detecting
against DNS-based attacks. In this work, we combined multiple methods, payload analysis
and traffic analysis, to detect both DNS tunneling and DNS exfiltration using visualization
and machine learning. We implemented DNS proxy to fully control clients’ DNS requests to
operate the proposed detection system to work in real-time.
To sum up, we built a detection system that acts as a DNS proxy server to have
full control over the DNS requests within the network. At the same time, we conducted
various DNS-based attacks using tools to simulate real-world scenarios such as TCP over
DNS, DNS exfiltration, command and control channels. The detection system obtains high
accuracy with no false-negative rate and fewer false-positive rates. Finally, we compared
the detection system results with Snort IDS results which also conducted similar previous
attacks. Snort IDS also scores high accuracy by 99%; however, it could not detect 50% of
the attacks. The results indicate that the detection system in this work, the DNS proxy, is
better detection against DNS-based attacks.
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7 Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter summarizes the work, including the system architecture design, eval-
uation, and results. It also identifies the limitations of the proposed system. Finally, it
describes future work.
7.1 Conclusion
In this dissertation, an original detection system is a network-based solution that de-
tects and prevents DNS-based attacks, including DNS tunneling, DNS exfiltration technique,
and command-and-control was developed. The detection system’s primary goal is to detect
not only high-throughput DNS tunneling techniques but also low-throughput DNS-based
attacks. The detection system acts as a DNS proxy server that receives and resolves DNS
requests from clients in real-time, as well as analyzing the data offline. The detection sys-
tem can be broken down into three main components: visualization, machine learning-based
detection, and the real-time analyzer modules.
First, we introduced a fast and scalable visualization module to detect and iden-
tify DNS tunneling attacks based on the parallel coordinates technique in the visualization
module. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time the DNS tunneling attack has
been visualized using parallel coordinates. Network traffic was collected for one week to
create a dataset to study the normal behavior of DNS. Six DNS parameters for the parallel
coordinates technique were chosen and used to visualize the DNS traffic using the paral-
lel coordinates technique in order to distinguish between normal DNS traffic and malicious
traffic containing DNS tunneling attacks. Based on this module, four unique DNS tunnel-
ing patterns were identified, each representing various scenarios of DNS tunneling attacks
using the parallel coordinates technique. Visualizations were created that are visually very
different so that they can be used in the future for detecting DNS tunneling attacks.
Next, the machine learning-based detection module uses real-time passively captured
DNS traffic from a network or offline previously captured traffic that is stored in PCAP files
to detect DNS tunneling attacks. This module is based on the work is done in Chapter 3,
the visualization module. It generates a graphical signature text representation that labels
the dataset for machine learning training and testing purposes. The machine learning-based
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detection module consists of three main components: the Parser, the Analyzer, and the
Detector, where the Parser captures and feeds the system with DNS data. The analyzer
prepares and analyzes the data for the next step, which is the Detector. The Detector works
as a decision-maker built based on supervised learning and pre-trained objects, determining
whether the DNS tunneling attack occurs. During the experiment, three months of DNS
traffic were captured and collected within a controlled network. In addition, we simulated
the DNS tunneling attack by performing the attack within the network. Then we used these
captured data and simulated attacks data to train, test, and evaluate our detection module.
As a result of this module, the system achieves 99% accuracy to detect all simulated cases
of the attacks with no false negatives and a low false-positive rate. Finally, the real-time
detection analyzer is a payload analysis module that applies various statistical and analytical
functions to the captured data in real-time. Once the DNS request is received, the payload
analysis module extracts domain name features to check various malicious characteristics to
determine if it is malicious.
The detection system is implemented as a network-based solution of a DNS proxy to
have complete control over clients’ DNS requests. The detection system targets DNS-based
attacks, including TCP over DNS, DNS exfiltration technique, and the command-and-control
communication channel. Even if the adversary uses the low-throughput DNS tunneling
technique, the detection system can detect and identify the attack using the payload analysis
module that uses real-time capture looking for malicious features. The detection system,
DNS proxy, combines the three modules discussed before to detect the DNS-based attacks.
Furthermore, the DNS proxy consists of two main modes, including the real-time and offline
detection modes.
As an overall result, the detection system presented in this work achieves sufficient
and satisfying results by obtaining a high accuracy detection rate with no false-negative rate
and fewer false-positive rates. During the experiment, we demonstrated that the detection
system is capable of providing efficient and scalable services by providing DNS services as
well as detection and prevention to clients within the active and busy network.
Finally, we validated the detection system results by comparing the detection system
and Snort IDS results with the same environment setup and attacks. Even though Snort
IDS scores high accuracy, it could not detect all the attack scenarios. It identified only 50%
of the performed attacks, of which 6 out 12 total attacks. The results show that the attacker
can bypass the Snort IDS by performing the low-throughput DNS exfiltration technique. In
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contrast, our detection system, DNS proxy, attained and scored more reliable and better
accuracy, precision, and F1-score performances. F1-score is the harmonic mean of precision
and recall models, and it is a method of combining and weighted average of both precision
and recall. It provides a better measurement of incorrect cases of detection than the overall
accuracy rate. The detection system in this work obtained a F1-score rate of 0.92, while
Snort IDS scored 0.66. The detection system, DNS proxy, identified and blocked all 12 cases,
including the high-throughput and low-throughput DNS exfiltration techniques. The DNS
proxy applies various methods to determine the attacks in real-time and offline detection
modes using visualization, machine learning classifiers, and statistical analysis. The results
indicate that the detection system in this work, the DNS proxy, is a better network-based
solution that monitors and detects the network environment for DNS-based suspicious or
unusual activity as well as provides a prevention mechanism.
Based on this work’s experimental results, we have designed an original, reliable, and
robust detection system that detects DNS-based attacks better than the commonly used
open-source Snort. Thus, the results indicate that the detection system is applicable and can
be employed and integrated into any network infrastructure for individuals or business levels
for providing DNS services and protection. System administrators can acquire great benefit
from this work by not only DNS services but also protection. The detection system obtained
high accuracy and precision rates to identify the DNS-based attacks and no false negatives.
The evaluation experiments in this work confirm that the detection system efficiently handled
and supplied DNS services to active and busy network DNS requests as well as protected
against DNS-based attacks, which helps in blocking the DNS communication channel as soon
as it detected.
7.2 Discussion and Limitations
The objective of this work is to detect and block DNS-based attacks. The detection
system consists of two main modes: the real-time and offline modes to detects two types of
DNS-based attacks, including low-throughput and high-throughput techniques. The reason
for designing two methods is to ensure identifying attacks using either one of them or both.
In the results chapter, we exhibited a case where the real-time detection missed the attack,
WhisperPacket. However, the offline mode was still able to detect the attack—having two
detection modes makes it more difficult for the adversary to bypass the system’s security
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measures.
We showed that the detection system works efficiently within an active and busy
home-lab network. However, it still has some limitations. The DNS proxy, the detection
system, is vulnerable to DNS server attacks, including DoS and DDoS, Server hijacking,
DNS spoofing, and cache poisoning attacks. Additional work is needed to secure the server.
Another limitation is within the caching functionality. The DNS proxy server caches the
received DNS query to fast lookup for the next time. The way that we execute the caching
is by generating a file that has clients’ DNS requests. Therefore, the file size may increase
and become large and causing some storage issues that need to be addressed in the future.
7.3 Future Work
The detection system has some limitations that need to be resolved. As we discussed
previously, the DNS proxy server is vulnerable to various DNS protocols and server attacks,
including DoS and DDoS, Server hijacking, DNS spoofing, and cache poisoning attacks.
Solving these issues is planned to be a part of future work to build a comprehensive detection
system—for example, the randomization of the source port and transactionID to prevent the
DNS cache poisoning attack. Moreover, we need to implement DNSSec, an extra security
layer to the existing DNS protocol, to prove the chain of trust using public-key cryptography
for authentication and data integrity as well as increase the overall security level of the
detection system.
This section highlights future work that can be done to extend this work. First,
more machine learning classifiers for the traffic analysis module could be evaluated for both
accuracy and speed. In addition, the techniques could be implemented and integrated into
home routers or commercial applications starting by designing a module for Snort. Finally,
the detection system could be deployed into the cloud and provide free cloud-based DNS
services and protection to clients.
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